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مركز المنصة للتنمية المستدامة
PLATFORM CENTER FOR SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT



STATE BUILDING IN IRAQ

POLICY-ORIENTED VIEWS TOWARDS SUSTAINABLE DEMOCRACY

Supervision team

Hashim Al Rikabi - Ghazwan Al-Manhilawi - Ali Al Mawlawi - Ali Al Saffar

Second Round

**State Building In Iraq
Policy–Oriented Views Towards
Sustainable Democracy**



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State Building in Iraq ... Policy Oriented Views Towards Sustainable Democracy

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About

Platform Center for Sustainable Development (PSDIraq) is a registered NGO at the Directorate of Non-governmental organisations in the General Secretariat of the Council of Ministers under the number (1S2106012). It is a space for thinking, discussing, and working towards positive change in Iraq.

Vision

We seek to establish a platform for dialogue and policies to contribute to achieving sustainable development goals in Iraq.

Mission

Bridging the gap between the state and society in a way that ensures the realization of the essence of democracy represented by the participation of citizens in the decision-making processes, through training, monitoring, analyzing, researching, awareness raising, and advocacy campaigns.

Strategic Goals

- Preparing Youth to fulfill their societal obligations by analyzing root causes of problems, proposing feasible and desirable policy alternatives and advocating for their implementation
- Presenting statistics and issues that occupy the political and societal scene to reflect a deeper understanding of Iraq's realities
- Encouraging youth to work towards achieving sustainable development goals
- Establishing a network of active, informed, and committed citizens towards Iraq's state-building project

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Overview of the Iraq Policy Program

The Iraq Policy Program aims at bridging the gap between youth leaders and decision makers by training the youth on positive change through decision-making. The program empowers participants to develop policy papers and advocacy campaigns, which will enhance governance practices and support the rule of law. This program allows participants to connect with decision makers and to learn about the main challenges and issues faced during the implementation and follow up of public policies. This program provides participants with a realistic reading of the decision making environment in Iraq, as well as a clear understanding of the opportunities and challenges of change.

The program is based on four Es approach:

- Equip: Helping participants to acquire the basic skills needed for preparing policy papers and effective advocacy campaigns.
- Explore: Explaining 10 important public policies in Iraq, given by established experts who cover institutional frameworks and procedures, implementation, debates surround each public policy and the prospect of reform.
- Engage: Training participants on developing advocacy campaigns and coordinating meetings with government officials in order to initiate the first steps of their campaigns.
- Enrich: Mentoring participants to draft their policy briefs in their area of interest in order to enrich public discussions and offer policy alternatives that can help policymakers in addressing existing problems.

The program is based on 100 hours that include the following:

- Intensive training: participants start the program with a 40 hour intensive training that will allow them to master the steps, mechanisms, and skills of scientific research, starting with developing the question, selecting the most suitable research method, collecting and analyzing data, drafting and publishing research, as well as, preparing and implementing advocacy campaigns.
 - Seminars: experts explain the different aspects of seven public policies in Iraq: the budget and economic reform, the public sector reform, the energy sector reform, services delivery, fighting corruption, electoral reform and political participation, and women and minorities rights.
 - Advocacy campaigns: participants develop advocacy campaigns in one of the above mentioned policies, and then meet face to face with decision makers to commence their campaigns.
 - Commencement project: participants shall write policy briefs in their areas of interest under the mentorship of experts of the Iraq policy program.
- **Skills acquired through the program**
- Research preparation and publication in general, and policy papers in particular.
 - Advocacy campaigns' preparation and implementation.
 - Networking with peers, stakeholders, and government officials.
 - Highlighting qualifications and studies of fellows on the website psdiraq.org, social media platforms, and printed materials.

Prelude

The relationship between state sectors and citizens is intertwined, where both parties participate in nurturing practices and developing solutions to achieve the best results. Hence, the Iraq Policy Program trained forty participants from all provinces of Iraq to involve them in developing solutions and proposing policy alternatives.

The trainees received an integrated series of training sessions and mentorship based on an approach that attempts to have fellows internalize concepts and skills into producing policy briefs to be published in the series entitled “State-Building in Iraq: Policy-Oriented Views Towards Sustainable Democracy.” In its second edition, the program concentrated on providing training on the concepts, skills, and applications of public policy. Mr. Hashim Al-Rikabi provided training on concepts, analytical frameworks, objectives, and types of public policy, as well as obstacles hindering the implementation of public policy. Mr. Ghazwan Al-Menhalawi covered data collection, visualization, and analysis topics to nurture data-based policies. Dr. Saad Salloum shared his established expertise on utilizing Multi-Track Diplomacy to influence public policymaking processes in Iraq.

Once the training was completed, the fellows were exposed to the institutional framework, stakeholders, and debates over ten crucial public policies, namely public sector reform, private sector reform, banking sector reform, electoral system reform, energy sector reform, combating corruption, societal co-existence, minority rights, and international indicators. All these seminars enriched fellows’ understanding and provided a realistic perception of the public policy-making process in Iraq.

After that, individual mentorship sessions were held for each fellow who presented a policy idea to develop it into a policy paper. All these papers were presented in a conference based on six sessions in which two or three fellows presented their papers and got feedback from experts of the Scientific Committee. The later committee consisted of Dr. Adel Al-Bedawi, Dean of Political Science college at Baghdad University, Dr. Bushra al-Zwaini, former Minister of State for Women's Affairs and Professor of Political Science, and Dr. Ali Taher, Managing Director of Al-Bayan Center for Planning and Studies, as well as the feedback of attending fellows. Such feedback strengthened the papers and paved the way for holding sessions with policymakers in an effort to advocate for their implementation. Five meetings were held with senior officials, including Dr. Muhammad Hadi Al-Hakim, Strategic Advisor of the Prime Minister, Dr. Abdul Husain Al_Hindawi, Advisor of the Prime Minister for Electoral Affairs, and Dr. Mohamed El-Sayed, Director General of the Department of Regional Planning at Ministry of Planning.

Introduction

Accumulated crises hinder development in Iraq and require an effort to identify their root causes and develop policies that target these roots rather than their consequences. Based on this, fellows of the second round of the Iraq Policy Program focused on problems in energy, finance, services, and investment, as well as the topics of new parties, the electoral experience, and human rights, in order to propose feasible and desirable policy alternatives.

Hashem Al-Husseini discussed the problem of flaring associated gas, this wealth that has been wasted since the discovery of oil. He explained the reasons that prevent investing in flare gas and its dire environmental and health consequences. He highlighted the importance of creating a suitable environment for investing this wealth.

Ali Karim Al-Mayahi discussed decentralization as a solution to the electricity problem, where he proposes to gradually transfer the powers of all production and distribution processes. This will encourage provinces to achieve self-sufficiency away from the current centralized governance of the electricity sector.

Mustafa Al-Taleb highlighted the challenges of implementing investment projects in liberated provinces. Luxury projects are prioritized at the expense of strategic projects that provide the infrastructure necessary to activate the investment file.

Mohammed Tariq discussed the banking sector and how to raise the credit rating of Iraq and its impact on the recovery of the banking sector through the ease of partnering with international financial institutions and reducing interest rates on international loans granted to Iraq.

In the context of new parties and their role in enriching the democratic experience, **Karrar Kammona** studied the phenomenon of fragmentation in parties that emerged after the 2019 protest. He conducted interviews with leaders of these parties to identify drivers and consequences of fragmentation.

Walaa Al-Gharabi addressed the drivers and solutions for the electoral boycott. He attempted to conceptually distinguish between boycotts and indifference or lack of interest. He highlights its consequences on the legitimacy of the system and its capacity to integrate all politically active citizens.

In the societal context, **Murooj Mohammed** addressed the issue of rights for an important social segment, namely Iraqis of African origin. This segment suffers from social and political marginalization that forces them to consider migration.

With its seven policy briefs, this book represents the second output of the Iraq Policy Program. It aims to enrich a better understanding among researchers and decision-makers alike on policy ideas that could contribute to addressing accumulated crises.

Associated gas, wasted wealth and expensive alternatives

Hashim Al-Husseini

Preface

This paper is an attempt to study the problem of flaring gas to find out the most significant obstacles that hinder the investment of this wealth and the amount of losses suffered by the Iraqi economy. This is attributed to the negligence in previous periods and the lack of a real desire to whistle the flaring, despite the urgent need for gas to operate power plant annually due to fuel shortages and frequent interruptions in the supply of gas from Iran. All this demonstrates the great need to stop waste in this sector and the economic impact it causes to pollute the environment.

This study adopts the quantitative method, where data are collected, analyzed, and compared production and investment of the associated gas as well as the local need and quantities and cost of imported Iranian gas and discuss the results and also took into account the opinions of officials and other stakeholders to find out the reasons behind the delay in investing the gas.

Introduction

Iraq has a gas reserve of 130.5 trillion standard cubic feet (about 22.5 billion barrels of equivalent oil), Iraq ranks 12th in the world and Iraq's gas reserves are divided between associated gas, cap gas, and gas fields. Iraq's fixed gas reserves can be classified as follows: 70% of them are associated with oil, 20% consist of gas (free gas fields), the rest 10% consist of cap gas, a gas that covers the oil layer in some of those oil fields. and about 83% of the associated gas in the southern oil fields, while the rest (17%) is located in the northern and middle fields. The proportion

of associated gas with oil in the southern fields is about twice that of the northern and central fields. Gas in the southern fields is sweet gas (containing very small amounts of sulfur) compared to the northern sour gas, which contains about 2.7% hydrogen sulphide. For decades, Iraq has burned most of its associated gas with the flame, which has become a hallmark of Iraqi oil fields for several reason, such as gas markets away from Iraq, the lack of global demand for it compared to oil and the lack of need in local markets because power plants are Thermal or diesel plants.

The use of gas as fuel for electricity generation is better compared to the use of oil, the cost of fuel to generate kWh in the case of gas is lower than when using oil and may reach half the cost but requires the use of composite cycle gas turbines, which are more efficient than Open-cycle gas evidence is also more efficient than steam turbines generated by burning oil. The composite cycle gas turbines generate electricity twice, the first time when the gas burns and the gas turbines are burned to generate electricity, and the second time when the same flaring gas is used after doing its work in moving the gas turbine to generate steam that moves steam turbines and this also generates electricity, this process (composite cycle) is the best of environmental considerations where there is almost zero emission of Carbon as a result of combustion.

Local demand


The local demand for gas in general is its use as liquid gas for domestic uses and fuel for gas-fired cars as well as its main use in its dry state as fuel in gas plants. After Iraq's expansion in the field of gas stations, the domestic need for gas increased and it became necessary to consider providing fuel for these plants to cover the need for electricity which required about 3273.75 mmscf daily and if we take into account the sufficiency of electricity, which represents the daily need for electric power, Iraq needs 29 gigawatts daily and if this energy is generated entirely by gas

power plants, the need for gas will double any approximately 6000 mmscf per day, which means that the free gas fields must be invested to provide this quantity and that the local need varies according to the seasons of the year in the prime time summer is different from the spring and autumn seasons, in which the atmosphere is moderate and consumption decreases, as the actual need increases annually as demand increases at the rate of 1 Gigawatt per year due to population growth and expansion of industrial projects and others.

Gas power plants

Iraq has 26 gas-fired power plants and generates a total of 14,550 MW, which represents more than 48% of daily electricity production, and some of these plants have been modified to operate on diesel or crude oil because there is not enough gas fuel, and this process (modification) causes high maintenance costs and significant operational costs in addition to large carbon emissions, and if fuel is available, these plants will return to work according to their basic design. 29 GW of electricity to reach daily energy sufficiency.

Figure (1): Gas Power Plants And Their Production Capacity In Megawatts




The available data on the production of associated gas shows the quantities as in the form below and when calculating the quantities burned for the years (2000–2018), Iraq has burned nearly 6337495 of a mmscf equivalent to approximately 5% of the confirmed gas reserves equivalent to \$36.3 billion and we note the upward increase in production offset by increased flaring and a slight increase in investment

It has been noted since 2009, the year of the so-called licensing rounds signed by Iraq with international investment companies and oil services, noting that the gas investment did not recover and it was expected that the oil contracts include any concerning the accompanying gas, but this paragraph was neglected and instead of modified or added by new negotiations, new licensing rounds were directed to 2011 concerning the gas fields and this step is unjustified in the shadow of the continued flaring of associated gas.

If production is carried out as planned at the time of the contract (12 million barrels per day as peak production) for fields covered by technical service contracts, this means producing more than three times the associated gas currently produced and it is not yet known the justification for not mentioning the associated gas in service contracts, which is of this quantity and importance, and if the accompanying gas investment projects were included, today and 12 years after these contracts we will reap the benefits of such projects, which are the least that can be provided is the addition of Infrastructure for insulation and treatment stations


Iraq, with this rate of flaring, ranks second in the world after Russia in the 2020 World Bank data and shares with six other countries responsibility for flaring two-thirds of the world's gas: Russia, Iraq, Iran, the United States, Algeria, Venezuela and Nigeria, and Iraq is the only country in the world to burn gas and import it to meet its needs.

Figure (2): Gas Quantities Produced, Invested And Burned Between 2000–2018



Basra Oil Company acquired the largest share among oil companies by flaring associated gas and by up to 71% in 2018 as described in the figure below and this is normal as Basra Oil Company has the largest share of oil production where it contributes more than 80% of Iraq oil production.

Figure (3): Amounts Of Gas Burned By Oil Companies For 2018



New projects

The Ministry of Oil recently aimed to expand gas investment projects and add several new projects that were distributed among fields in the southern region (Basra, Maysan and Dhi Qar Oil Companies) and these projects are the first renaissance in this sector

1- Basra Gas Company project, which is the unique experience of partnering with a foreign investor with a big experience in the oil industry, Shell Global, which under this project achieved a significant investment reached to 900 mmscf daily from three oil fields (Rumaila, West Qurna, Zubair) at the end of 2019

2- Gas investment project in Al-Halfaya oil field 300 mmscf daily

3- Ratawi integrated project, which was recently referred to the French company Total, which is one of the most important projects for the investment of associated gas with a production capacity of up to 600 mmscf/day and in two phases, the first phase will be treated gas fields (Majnoon, West Qurna 2, Artawi) with a capacity of 300 mmscf and the second phase with a capacity of 300 mmscf.

4- The associated gas investment project in Al-Nasiriyah and Al-Gharaf fields, which was recently referred to the American company Baker Hughes, which is planned to reach a production of 200 mmscf daily .

These projects together will achieve the investment of approximately 75% of the associated gas in the southern fields and represent a serious step to reach zero flaring gas and this goal will have a great return at the level of domestic consumption and then perhaps reach the export stage, to achieve hydrocarbon diversification.

Cost of Iraqi gas production

The cost of producing associated gas can be considered zero as long as it is produced with oil, as oil itself is the intended product and bears the cost of production.

Both, CAPEX and OPEX is estimated at \$/mmscf 2,409 of basra oil company. In a contract for a ratawi gas project with total company, the cost of one mmscf of the gas is only 850 dollars.

On 29 June 2021, Basra Gas signed a \$360 million loan agreement with the International Finance Corporation to support gas projects.

If we assume that every 400 mmscf needs 360 million dollars to process it, the zeroing flaring gas, which is 1,629 mmscf per day, will require approximately \$1.5 Billion, and these costs are possible to save through such loans or through partnership with international companies or financing organizations.

Iranian Gas

1- Iranian gas is close to Iraq so there is no need for pressure stations where it is transported and used in its gas condition, the gas does not need such stations on the Iranian side or the Iraqi side.

2- Iraq is a market for Iranian goods due to political understandings and the convergence of the economic environment, which facilitates the conclusion of economic agreements and the possibility of paying the cost of gas with goods. Recently, the Secretary General of the Joint Iranian-Iraqi Chamber of Commerce Hamid Hosseini announced the establishment of a company in Iraq to settle Iranian debts in exchange for Iraqi goods and materials

3- The Iranian side sells enabling Iraq to pay dues in times of liquidity cost of Iranian gas

Cost of Iranian gas

In late June 2017, Iraq began importing gas from Iran and gas volumes increased significantly to 50 million cubic meters per day in 2020, or approximately 1,765.7 cubic meters per day. Former Oil Minister Ihsan Abdul Jabbar said on 5th September 2021 that Iraq buying Iranian gas at a cost of \$8 per million thermal units.

To calculate the cost of one of the Iranian gas, we make the following calculations. Each cubic foot of natural gas contains 1,015 thermal units. Each mmscf (1 million standard cubic feet) contains 1,015,000,000 thermal units. Every million calories costs \$8. Therefore, each mmscf costs about \$8,120.

As mentioned above, the quantities of Iranian gas imported in 2020 reached 1,765.7 mmscf per day. This means that the daily cost of what Iraq imports from Iran 14,337,768 \$/day is equivalent to \$5,233,285,393 per year.

Environmental impact

Flaring gas is a major source of greenhouse gas that causes global warming in addition to polluting the atmosphere and the resulting diseases, especially in areas near the oil fields, where the number of cancers has increased significantly. The flaring of 1.0 mmscf of the gas generates 63 tons of carbon dioxide, and if we take the value of Iraq's flaring of 1629 mmscf daily, the amount of carbon dioxide generated will be 102,627 tons/day in the case of total combustion, but in the natural case, which is the absence of complete combustion, in this case more dangerous Gases emitted from incomplete combustion cause many health and environmental problems and also cause increased desertification.

Political impact

Energy is important for countries, no political stability and no economic growth without energy security this triangle complements each other and Iraq cannot maintain independence and is dependent on the energy supply of another country and repeated interruptions of electricity fuel popular anger. Such dependency could be utilized for obtaining economic gains or influencing a particular political direction as well.

Mechanisms and solutions

1- Taxes

In most countries, oil companies and refineries pay additional taxes on the amount of carbon they release to the atmosphere according to recommendations of the Glasco Conference, that such a mechanism can reduce the flaring of associated gas and pressure oil companies speed up the treatment of gas flaring in the fields under their control. Tax exemptions can also be granted to companies that invest the associated gas fully in their projects.

2- Power plants

The construction of gas power plants near oil fields with a large gas rate to reduce the cost of transporting gas makes this area more competitive and attracts investors in this sector.

Conclusion

- 1- The cost of processing one mmscf of associated gas is equal to a quarter of the cost of imported Iranian gas.
- 2- What is spent on the purchase of Iranian gas in 3 months is enough to finance gas flaring treatment projects.
3. Gases emitted pose a significant threat to health and the environment.
- 4- International organizations and institutions are of great importance in accelerating the process of investing associated gas by financing projects and encouraging efforts to stop this waste.

Recommendations

- 1- Investing the experience of the partnership between Basra Gas and Shell and the success achieved by this partnership to invite foreign companies to expand their investments in this sector.
- 2- Obliging the Ministry of Electricity to pay all financial dues to the Ministry of Oil and emphasizing the use of these amounts to finance the associated gas projects.
- 3- Approaching international institutions to finance gas investment projects associated with long-term loans.
- 4- Utilizing OPEC plus production reduction period agreement to direct investments and contracts towards gas investment.
- 5- Holding partnerships or contracts based on environmentally friendly and low-carbon projects.

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Administrative and Financial Decentralization As a Mechanism for Solving the Electricity Crisis in Iraq

Ali Karim Al-Mayahi

Electricity: Ongoing Crisis

More than any other sector, the energy sector presents challenges in policy coordination, which requires energy availability with the growth of new sources of demand for it. The electricity problem is one of the delicate problems facing Iraqi citizens and the economy. It is not only an economic or service issue but a political issue as well, both internally and externally.

The collapse of the electricity system began in the first Gulf War in 1991 when the international coalition launched attacks in which 11 out of the 20 primary power plants in Iraq were destroyed, 119 substations were destroyed entirely, and six other main stations were damaged. At the war's end, the electricity production rate had reached 4% of its pre-war level. When Iraq was subjected to an economic blockade, it became difficult to build new power plants.

After the fall of Saddam's regime in 2003, successive Iraqi governments tried to construct new power plants that depended on gas, even though it was not sufficiently available locally. Given Iraq's significant population growth; electricity demand is increased by 10% annually and is exacerbated by corruption and mismanagement on the supply side. The electricity problem has turned into the most complex national issue. It is just as important as the problem of unemployment or the issue of housing, where the electricity sector suffers from a chronic deterioration in its infrastructure, a shortfall in production, a weakness in the quality of the grid for transmission and distribution, and the failure to collect fees.

Certainly, solving the electricity problem is not impossible, and the experiences of other countries can be used in dealing with this issue. Among these important solutions are administrative and financial decentralization and the distribution of central powers to the governorates, just as the powers of eight ministries were

transferred to the governorates, albeit in stages, such as the files of production and generation. There are many benefits of decentralization including improving efficiency in service delivery so that local governments can make policy decisions without waiting for the approval of the central government, which relieves the bureaucratic burden and increases efficiency at the domestic level.

Furthermore, to improve accountability and bring decisions and resources closer to citizens needs to address negligence, promote citizenship and extend citizen participation, fragmentation of the central power, and the promoting of political competition by the amendment of the Amended Governorates Law No. 21 of 2008 and Law of the Ministry of Electricity No. 53 of 2017. This is what the World Bank supports in its project (rebuilding and strengthening electricity services in Iraq), which began in 2019 in cooperation with the Iraqi government. Therefore, this paper proposes the application of administrative and financial decentralization to solve the electricity problem, which represents one of the solutions aimed at improving the electricity reality in Iraq.

Electricity: Significantly High Economic Costs

The electricity shortages have emerged as a major obstacle to economic growth in the country since 2003. The World Bank estimates the annual economic cost due to the electricity shortage is at about \$40 billion, as poor electricity services and insufficient and poor infrastructure hinder private sector development. It negatively affects economic growth and impedes the government's attempts to reduce poverty, which was one of the reasons for the anti-government protests in October 2019. There is no doubt that the simultaneous and complex challenges of the electricity sector are nothing but the result of a failed business model that is unable to generate sufficient revenues to support itself or provide a service to consumers¹.


Electrical power losses

Achieving satisfactory performance from the electricity grid may take according to current estimates from 10 to 12 years, which is a long-term schedule. According to reliable estimates, transmission and distribution losses range between 40-50%. Up to 90% are attributed to distribution losses, including technical losses, non-

1. Harry Estebanian, *Solar Energy in Iraq from Dawn to Dusk*, Published Policy Paper, Friedrich Ebert Foundation, Al Bayan Center for Studies and Planning 2020.

technical losses such as theft and non-issuance invoices, broken meters, and illegal electrical interconnection. The lack of spare parts and adequate maintenance leads to an unexpected increase in technical losses. In comparison, the transmission and distribution losses in Iran, for example, are about 12.6% and the world average is 8%².

Figure (1): Comparing The Losses In Electricity



Source: Khaled Al-Terkawi, Sovereignty of Iraq and the Electricity File, September 2020.

Iraq Electricity Transmission Grid

In 2019, the Ministry of Electricity revealed plans to fund a \$3 billion transmission and distribution grid modernization to reach the target of delivering at least 20 hours of electricity nationwide. The plan did not gain the approval of the Parliament after the Prime Minister – Adel Abdul-Mahdi – stepped down from his post. The lack of central government funds means that the Ministry of Electricity cannot fund this modernization project, as current electricity tariffs do not cover the costs. In addition, the Ministry of Electricity complained about the absence of an institutional framework essential for reform, which, along with public corruption and political pressure, is reflected in poor performance.

2. Robin Mills and Maryam Salman, Supplying Iraq with Energy, Challenges Facing the Electricity Sector in Iraq, Published Policy Paper, Friedrich .Ebert, Al Bayan Center for Studies and Planning 2020.

Table (1): Disbursements On Transmission And Distribution 2005–2019

Projects Type	Allocation
Disbursements on Transmission projects	4,995,000,000
Disbursements on grid rehabilitation projects	4,269,000,000
Disbursements on operation, control, training and energy protection	125,000,000
Total in billions of dollars	9,389,000,000

Source: Report of the Committee formed under the Parliamentary Order (62) in July 2020

Indicators of corruption and mismanagement

At the beginning of this year, the Parliamentary Committee assigned with investigating the contracts of the Ministry of Electricity, headed by the First Deputy Speaker Hassan Al-Kaabi, announced the referral of 46 corruption files to the competent courts. The committee announced that the total expenditure on contracts for the ministry of electricity during the period from 2005–2019 about 81 billion dollars. The report of the Parliamentary Committee indicates that there is a significant difference between the actual annual financial allocations to the Ministry of Electricity and the actual expenses recognized in its records compared to the annual allocations and actual expenses recorded in the Ministry of Planning, with a difference of approximately 9 trillion Iraqi dinars.

Despite the generous government spending on electricity, the Ministry has implemented some of its projects on foreign loans and from various international institutions, whose repayment period ranged from 2017 to 2048, as this constitutes an additional burden on public finances in the coming years, in addition to the interest on those loans. The report notes that the Ministry of Electricity has concluded contracts with two companies (Car and Rabban Al Safina) to purchase power at a price of \$47/MWh for a period of 15 years after developing the stations (Shatt Al-Arab, Al-Amarah, Al-Rumaila), and converting them from the simple cycle to the combined cycle at a cost of (9,825,698,000) billion US dollars for the duration of the contract. While the study submitted by the technical department in the ministry estimated the cost at (1,352,350,000) billion US dollars if the ministry implemented that, and by comparing between the concluded contracts and the

cost of the speculative study sees that there is a waste of public money amounting to (8,473,348,000) billion US dollars. The report also referred to the lagging and stalled strategic projects, which were a catalyst in the aggravation of the electricity supply crisis, as well as a financial burden that weighs on the general budget, as the electrical production capacity of these projects is estimated at (7484) megawatts. This means dispensing with a large part of the purchase of imported power or from investment companies.

Table(2): Lagging And Stalled Strategic Projects

Project name	Total capacity megawatts	Effective start date	Delivery rate
Anbar power station -combined cycle	1642.6	2013	55% materials +basic designs
Anbar thermal power plant	1400	1987	6%
Sad Al- adheum	27.34	1999	40%
North thermal power station	1400	1988	15%
Youssoufia thermal station	1682	1988	50%
Dibs gas power station	320	---	28%
Baji gas power station	1014	2014	2014 up to 91%

Law of Ministry of Electricity

The law of Ministry of Electricity No. 53 of 2017 implicitly referred to decentralization and partnership with local governments, as stated in Article Two / Six: The gradual transition from central administration to decentralized administration in the activities of operating and maintaining production and distribution facilities. While it touched on Article 3 / Seven: regulating the involvement of local governments in investment and partnership between the public and private sectors in the areas of production and distribution. tenth of the same article “recommend to grant licenses to national and foreign private companies to invest in the fields of establishing new production and distribution stations in accordance with the state’s public- policy and in coordination with the National Investment Commission and investment authorities in governorates that are not incorporated into a region.

Table (3): Regional Divisions Of The Ministry Of Electricity

Area	Production	Transmission	Distribution
North	General company of electricity production North region	General company of electricity transmission North	General company of electricity distribution North
Middle	General company of electricity production Middle region	General company of electricity transmission middle	General company of electricity distribution middle
Euphrates	General company of electricity production Euphrates	General company of electricity transmission upper Euphrates and middle	General company of electricity distribution Baghdad
South	General company of electricity production South region	General company of electricity transmission South	General company of electricity distribution south

Source: ministry of electricity

The Iraqi constitution and decentralization

The 2005 Iraqi constitution guarantees administrative decentralization. The principles of federalism and administrative decentralization are inspired by the Law of State Administration for the Transitional phase of 2004 and Order No. 71 issued by the Coalition Provisional Authority of 2004. It guarantees the administration of governorates that are not incorporated into a region by provincial councils, which are elected locally. As it came in Chapter Five under the title (Regional Authorities) and the first chapter of it under the title (Regions), and Article (116) states that (the federal system in the Republic of Iraq consists of a capital, regions, decentralized governorates, and local administrations). Thus, the constitution has clarified the form of the Iraqi state and its administrative divisions, where the emphasis was placed on decentralization in managing the functions of the state, giving more powers to the regions and governorates, and waiving from the central government to the administrative units. Thus the statehood is based on two different forms or frameworks, the first is federal, and the second is decentralized units. As for the second section of the same chapter (the governorates that were not incorporated into a region), it came with two articles (122 and 123). Article 122 stipulates in the second paragraph: governorates that are not recognized in a region granted

broad financial and administrative powers to enable them to manage their affairs in accordance with the principle of administrative decentralization, and this shall be regulated by a law”.

Third: The governor, who is elected by the provincial council, is considered the chief executive officer in the province, to exercise his powers authorized by the council.

As for Article 123: It stipulates that (the powers of the federal government may be delegated to the governorates or vice versa, with the consent of both parties, and this is regulated by law.

Supporting decentralization

Administrative decentralization is defined as the transfer of responsibility for providing public service from the central government to local administrative units, regional governments, or local governments. this is guaranteed by the Iraqi constitution and ministry of electricity Law No. 53 of 2017, and the Law of Governorates Not Incorporated into a Region No. 21 of 2008. Administrative decentralization is also defined as the granting of resources and responsibility for certain services to local governments. Without some form of fiscal autonomy, local governments cannot perform their functions effectively and become dependent on the central government for resources. This is assured by the Financial Management Law No. 6 of 2019.

Administrative and fiscal decentralization and Electricity

Decentralization has a main goal, which is to improve services. Because the Ministry of Electricity failed to manage the electricity file and provide services that meet citizens’ needs despite the large financial expenditure that exceeded \$81 billion. This calls for us to rethink the way the electricity file is managed, and the real problem facing the continuation of the energy supply, the unbearable mismanagement and financial corruption.

It is known that electricity in Iraq is centrally managed through public companies, north, central and southern. Where production, transmission and distribution are linked to Baghdad, the capital, and then distributed to the provinces through the control center in the ministry, which some provinces complain about the quota method followed by the control center. Which is usually subject to political pressures.

Conclusion

Certainly, it is not possible to follow the same management and method and expect different results. Therefore, it is necessary to put forward different ideas to help solving the major problem of electricity. Among these solutions is the application of administrative and fiscal decentralization to solve the electricity problem in Iraq in a gradual manner that takes into account the organizational capabilities of the governorates, and that is achieved by:

1. Amending the law of governorates not incorporated into a region No. 21 of 2008 amended to include the Ministry of Electricity to transfer part of its administrative and financial powers to the governorates.
2. Amending the Financial Management Law of 2019 to have 100% instead of just 50% of fees collected by local administration.
3. Reallocating of investment fund from the Ministry to the governorates, whether from the general budget, loans or international agreements.
4. Granting sufficient administrative and financial powers to the governorates as stated in the White Paper for economic reform by contracting with foreign companies for the purpose of establishing power stations and according to the feature that characterizes each governorate, whether it is a thermal, gas or solar plant, and under the supervision of the federal government.
5. Establishing a company in each province in the name of the provinces, the Basra Energy Company for example, manage the electricity file in the governorate.

The role of Infrastructure in Providing the Investment Climate in Nineveh Governorate

Mustafa Khaldoun Al-Talib

Introduction

The availability of infrastructure in any country is one of the main pillars that contribute to supporting and increasing economic growth and then development, as well as encouraging local investments, attracting foreign investments, helping to meet local demand, and competing with foreign goods in local and foreign markets. Therefore, the availability of infrastructure leads to the creation of the investment climate, which is the primary driver of economic development, and if an appropriate and attractive investment climate is created that takes into account political, economic, social and administrative issues, this would contribute to the development of industry and technology, diversification of agricultural production, increase its productivity and strengthen the green economy.

The investment reality in Nineveh Governorate suffers from a lack of investment opportunities, and the delay in their completion for many years compared to other investment projects in the rest of the Iraqi governorates. The governorate's infrastructure continues to suffer severe damage as a result of the Daesh occupation of the governorate and the almost complete destruction it caused, which exceeded 80%. The paper studies the problem that the destruction of the infrastructure in Nineveh Governorate contributed to the decline in the services provided by those infrastructures. In order to promote investment and provide an appropriate environment, this requires the basic infrastructure suitable for work.

This paper is divided into the following sections:

- 1- What is the investment reality in the Nineveh Governorate?
- 2- What are the reasons for the absence of infrastructure in the Nineveh Governorate?
- 3- What are the solutions needed to provide the appropriate investment climate in the Nineveh Governorate?

First: The investment reality in Nineveh

Nearly four years after the liberation of Nineveh Governorate from the terrorist occupation of Daesh, the governorate is still suffering from the implication of military actions that prevent the return of normal life as well as impede economic growth. The war led to the destruction of a large part of the city’s infrastructure, which raises questions about the role of public and private investment in the reconstruction of Mosul. As a number of investors in Nineveh held the responsibility for the investment stagnation and the shirking of the private sector’s economic activity in the governorate on the absence and lack of the adequate infrastructure for the investment projects. The number of licensed projects from 2009 to 2021 reached 107 projects, including the sectors of industry, agriculture, tourism, services, housing, health, education and sports. 21 of which were withdrawn, and 18 were completed, as shown in the following tables.

Table (1): Projects Licensed By Sectors And Years

Year	Sectors							
	Industry	Agriculture	Tourism	Services	Housing	Health	Education	Sport
2009	2	4	5	1				
2010	4	1	3	8	2	3		
2011	4	1	4	1		1		
2012	1	1	3	2	5	1		
2013			4	4	1			
2014		2	4	8	3		1	
2018					1			
2019			2	4				2
2020		1	1	4	2	1		1
2021					2	2		
Total	11	10	26	32	16	8	1	3

Source: Nineveh Investment Authority, Economic Division, 2021.

Table (2): Projects Withdrawn By Sectors And Years

Year	Sectors					
	Industry	Agriculture	Tourism	Services	Housing	Health
2009		2		1		
2010	1			1		
2011	1		1			1
2012	1					
2013 - 2017 no project withdrawn						
2018			2			1
2019			2	1		
2020	2			2		1
2021					1	
Total	5	2		5	1	3
Grand total	21					

Source: Nineveh Investment Authority, Economic Division, 2021.

Looking at Tables No. (4,3,2,1) show us the low numbers of completed projects during the period from 2009 to 2021, as out of 107 projects (18) were completed. Moreover, these projects are not relatively large-scale projects that are not considered strategic projects. In the industrial sector, (5) projects were completed, divided among iron and steel mills, the development of a company for turnkey construction and an asphalt plant. In the agricultural sector, (4) projects were completed, divided among agriculture protected by greenhouses, a cold storage, a farm for beef-fattening, and a project for the mushroom production. As for the tourism sector, it has completed (5) projects divided among a recreational complex, a park, the Nineveh International Hotel – bombed during the war on ISIS – and Um Al-Rabeein Island, a project that has also been suspended due to the ferry

accident in 2019. As for the services sector, it has completed (4) projects divided among building Commercial, gas station, commercial complex and supermarket. As for the projects ongoing, the percentage of completion in most of them is low, not exceeding 35%.

Table (3): Completed Investment Projects By Sectors And Years

Sectors						
Year	Industry	Agriculture	Tourism	Services	Housing	Health
2009		1				
2010			1			
2011	2			2		
2012	2	1				
2013	1	1		1		
2014 - 2017 no project completed						
2018			1			
2019		1	2			
2020				1		
2021			1			
Total	5	4	5	4		
Grand total	18					

Source: Nineveh Investment Authority, Economic Division, 2021

The problem of the lack of investment projects in Nineveh is due to a number of reasons:

- 1- **The problem of land allocation:** The problem of the Nineveh Investment authority lies in how to find sites and lands for the establishment of large projects, as the basic design of the city of Mosul has not changed since 2003 and has needed an urgent need for expansion, it is one of the most important obstacles to offering investment opportunities in Nineveh Governorate and the city of Mosul. There is also a delay in investment licenses for projects that the investor intends to establish on lands belonging to the state, as it requires obtaining several approvals, including the approval of the relevant ministry in addition to the approval of the Ministry of Finance¹.
- 2- **The legal problem:** Although the investment law has undergone many substantial amendments to its texts during the past ten years, the law still needs substantial amendments, according to legal experts, the most important of which is granting full ownership of foreign investors to their projects, in addition to abolishing the recruitment requirement of local labor at high rates. Although the Iraqi investment law currently in force in the country has made this clause related to employment an unavoidable prerequisite in licensing investment projects for foreigners in order to provide job opportunities, the legal Expert believe that “the country is in the first steps of investment, and that the foreign investor through injecting millions of dollars into the project. In return, the investor wants to attract skilled labor that may not be available in Iraq at the present time. Attracting skilled labor and specialized personnel will save Iraq the transfer of modern technology in various fields.”²
- 3- **The Security problem:** The security file is one of the most important challenges facing inventors and investment projects, as the economic parties and tribal disputes, as well as the threat of the spread of organized crime and outlaw groups, and the latter’s imposition of royalties on companies and threatening their interests and workers in case of non-payment of those royalties. All this prompted many international companies to reconsider working and investing in Nineveh Governorate.

1. Nassar Al-Nuaimi, The Investment Reality in Nineveh ... Opportunities and Obstacles, Al-Zaman newspaper (London), April 8, 2012

2. Ahmed Al-Dabbagh, Conflicting Laws and Bureaucratic Obstacles Impeding Investment in Iraq, N Post, report published on the International Information Network and available at the following link: <https://www.noonpost.com/content/25111>

4- Absence of infrastructure: Nineveh governorate was subjected to a major destruction of infrastructure due to ISIS's occupation of the governorate in 2014. The United Nations estimated the damage of infrastructure in Nineveh governorate at 80%, and in factories and industrial companies to range between 60%–75%. Therefore, the availability of the necessary infrastructure, such as bridges, airports, and hospitals, is one of the most important pillars that the government must provide to attract investments to the country.

The lack of projects in Nineveh is due to the disruption and the absence of a great part of the basic infrastructure, such as:

a- Absence of roads and bridges:

Throughout Nineveh Governorate, there are 63 bridges, most of which were destroyed during the ISIS control of the province. The terrorist organization destroyed 57 bridges with explosive devices, while others were destroyed by air strikes carried out by allied forces, or Iraqi military aircrafts with the aim of cutting off supply routes to the terrorist organization.

After the operations to liberate Mosul from ISIS in 2017, five major bridges were destroyed on the Tigris River inside Mosul and three bridges on the Khosr River inside the city as well. The Roads and Bridges Directorate repaired 54 bridges across the governorate at a cost of more than \$40 million, bearing in mind that the fourth and fifth bridges which were the two main bridges in Mosul were not reconstructed despite the announcement by the local administration in the province in 2021 that they were referred to two Turkish and Egyptian companies for their reconstruction in the coming years.³

b- Absence of the airport:

The airport plays an important role in attracting and preparing the investment environment for the city, as it is characterized by its proximity to the center of Mosul, with an area of 4 km², or approximately 1,600 acres, adjacent to the Tigris River. Before its occupation by ISIS gangs, it operated 24 hours with 20 local and international flights. Except for the unscheduled Hajj and Umrah trips, the number

3. Worod Salih after years of regaining it...Mosul without bridges and suffocating traffic jams, Kirkuk Now/May 27/3021, a report published on the International Information Network and available at the following link: <https://kirkuknow.com/ar/news/65648> , citing a phone call with the Director of Nineveh Roads and Bridges, Abdul Sattar al-Habbo.

of passengers reached 50,000 annually. Note that the length of the airport's concrete runway is 2,650 meters, 45 meters wide, and asphalt shoulders on both sides of the runway are 7.5 meters wide.

After ISIS occupied the province in 2014, the terrorist groups gradually destroyed the airport, starting with the aerial surveillance tower, passenger terminals, the rest of the ancillary buildings and the airport infrastructure. In addition to looting and pillaging all the specialized equipment of the airport, the terrorist groups dug trenches along the runway with the width of 10 meters, 1.5 meters deep. The distance between one trench and another (80–100 meters)⁴, with 22 trenches, which constituted the major impediment to the rehabilitation and operation of the airport in a short time, as the percentage of damage was as in the following table:

Table (4): The Percentage Of Damage At Mosul Airport

Runway	25%
Aviation ramp	5%
Aerial surveillance tower	100%
Navigation equipment	100%
Navigation light	100%
Terminals	100%
Infrastructure and perimeter security fence for airport	100%
Buildings and other facilities (civil defense–supporting administrative office buildings)	100%

Source: Omar Hashem Hussein, Mosul International Airport Media Unit

On the other hand, the Civil Aviation Authority signed a memorandum of understanding for the rehabilitation and development of Mosul International Airport to the great French company (ADP-I). Despite the delay in referring the airport, the Civil Aviation Authority confirmed that the process of rehabilitating the airport will be carried out by French companies, which will be through The

4. Omar Hashem Hussein, Mosul International Airport Media Unit, (Mosul: 2019).

French loan laws, which requires the work of the master-plan for the airport, the evaluation of the prices of the loan, the signing of the contract and implementation.

c- Electricity:

The power sector in the province has been heavily damaged as a result of the conflict conditions resulting from the occupation and seizure of the country by ISIS. This has led to the deterioration of public electricity supplies in most parts of the country affected by the conflicts. Furthermore, limited energy access has impeded efforts to reform the electricity supply infrastructure at the city and governorate levels. The lack of electricity supply due to the damage caused by the conflicts, has had a negative effect on the operation and recovery of key social services such as health, education, water and sanitation, and the telecommunications sector.

Although workers in the electricity distribution were able to repair and deliver power to the neighborhoods of Mosul, there is a chronic shortage in providing the province with power. The problem is not only related to production, but affects transmission and distribution, a problem that Iraq still suffers from.

d- Tourist facilities:

The governorate of Nineveh, in terms of tourism facilities and cultural heritage, has suffered the most damage among the governorates of Salah al-Din and Anbar. Many cultural heritage assets were subjected to significant damage and demolition by the terrorist ISIS, including Mosul's old city, the Al-Hadba Minaret, the Al-Nuri Mosque, the Monastery of Saint Elijah and the Mosul Museum, as well as for the destruction of tourist hotels, including (Nineveh International Hotel) and its out of service. The World Bank estimated the amount of the damages at about (518) billion dinars.⁵

e- Absence of Hospitals:

The war of liberation in Mosul led to the destruction of nearly 20 main and sub-divisional hospitals throughout the province, and the most damage was to the right side of the city of Mosul, which includes the main medical complex in the city, which is very similar to the medical city in the capital, Baghdad. This war also destroyed 6 specialized medical centers in the governorate, which are the cardiac

5. The World Bank Group, Iraq: Reconstruction and Stability, Part Two, (Baghdad: 2018), p. 45.

surgery center, Cancer, Kidney Diseases, Diabetes and other centers. The total of medical beds allocated to patients in hospitals decreased from 6000 beds before 2014 to about 1700 after the war. Not only that, the governorate still lacks the necessary medical equipment, in addition to the fact that most of the specialized doctors work outside the governorate. On the other hand, the efforts to reconstruction these hospitals and specialized centers are not soon, as Mosul needs the concerted efforts of the central government and international organizations, and huge sums, as the Ministry has replaced these hospitals and centers with alternative sites and caravan hospitals to provide medical services to the people of the government.⁶

f- Absence of banks:

The military conflict had a direct impact on a branch of the Central Bank in Mosul, and a large number of banking branches. The central bank branch in Mosul was destroyed, with damage estimated at 20 billion dinars. In addition, ISIS seized in 2014 the bank's funds and other banking branches, amounting to 971 billion dinars, of which 685 billion dinars, including 587 billion dinars in local currency, and 84 million dollars in foreign exchange (taken from the branch of the Central Bank of Iraq in Mosul). All governmental and private banks were also subjected to seizure and destruction by the ISIS organization.⁷

Second: The reasons for the deterioration and absence of infrastructure in Nineveh Governorate:

A number of reasons led to the absence or deterioration of infrastructure and the delay in its reconstruction, which are the following:

- 1- The war on the terrorist organization ISIS and the liberation of Nineveh Governorate from it, as the city of Mosul was almost completely destroyed in its infrastructure and superstructure, and the properties of civilians and government institutions, during the battles to regain control of it from ISIS militants, in addition to the exposure of basic infrastructure, as stations Electricity, water stations, health, educational, financial and security institutions, in addition to civilian properties such as homes and cars, with a destruction of 80%.

6. Hafsa Judeh, Mosul.. Destroyed hospitals and a deteriorating health reality, Noon Post, 1/ November/2018, a report published on the International Information Network and available at the following link: <https://www.noonpost.com/content/25367>

7. The Central Bank of Iraq, Bank branches that were controlled by ISIS and the procedures of the Central Bank of Iraq to rehabilitate them and secure their return to work, (Baghdad: 2017), pg 4.

- 2- The administrative and financial corruption of the former governor of Nineveh, Nawfal al-Akoub, the waste and misappropriation of funds that resulted in bogus or semi-fictional projects. On September 22, 2019, the Iraqi Integrity Commission announced the loss of about 64 million dollars from the governorate's budget, misappropriated by employees close to the governor prior to his dismissal from his post following the sinking of the ferry in Mosul. The British Foreign Office also imposed sanctions on Al-Akoub's administration, accusing him of being involved in a corruption deal in misappropriating public funds allocated for reconstruction efforts and building infrastructure, and awarding contracts. In addition, the corruption deals that affected members of the dissolved Nineveh governorate Council, as the Provincial Council was accused of corruption deals that affected a number of its members, which led to the parliament's dissolving it.
- 3- The corona pandemic, as the central government imposed a comprehensive curfew throughout Iraq, to help limit the spread of the virus, which led to the suspension of reconstruction projects for more than six months, as well as the suspension of the work of international organizations, including the United Nations Development Program, which it works through the project of stabilization in Mosul, and rehabilitate infrastructure and vital services, where the UNDP temporarily suspended its field operations in mid-March in response to the curfew and movement restrictions announced by the Iraqi government, in implementation of the directives of the World Health Organization.
- 4- The decline in World oil prices, as Iraq has lost fiscal revenues of \$ 11 billion since the beginning of the year 2020, due to the deterioration of oil prices in global markets as a result of the oversupply caused by the outbreak of the "Corona" pandemic, compared to the prices that prevailed in the same period of the year. 2019, which negatively impact on projects funding and infrastructure reconstruction in areas liberated from the terrorist organization ISIS, including Nineveh Governorate.
- 5- Political instability in the central government, the events that followed the October demonstrations, the resignation of Adel Abdul-Mahdi's government,

the delay in selecting a candidate for prime minister by the political blocs, as well as the parliament's failure to approve the draft 2020 budget, and it was later forced to approve an emergency spending bill To allow the cash-strapped government to borrow from abroad, as the economy was hit by the drop in oil prices. This reflected negatively on infrastructure projects in the liberated areas, including Nineveh Governorate.

- 6- Poor planning in allocating the necessary funds to restore infrastructure projects in Nineveh Governorate. The projects funded by the local government either remained on paper only or were built as media marketing projects such as sidewalk projects, projects of traffic islands, projects of dancing fountains and furnishing roads at a time when the governorate is suffering from a severe shortage of school buildings, as well as hospitals and medical centers.
- 7- The delay in approving the formation of the Mosul Reconstruction Committee, as four years after the liberation of Nineveh Governorate from ISIS, Prime Minister Mustafa Al-Kadhimi directed the formation of the Higher Committee for the Reconstruction of Mosul, provided that the committee would be headed by him and the membership of the Ministers of: Finance, Planning, Construction, Housing and Municipalities, The Director of the Prime Minister's Office, the Secretary-General of the Council of Ministers, in addition to the Chairman of the National Investment Commission, the Head of the Reconstruction Fund for the Liberated Areas and the Governor of Nineveh. The committee will initially undertake a mapping of the most important projects from destroyed roads, bridges, schools and hospitals, to the housing sector, which affects the residents of the governorate in a way direct, and the large number of destroyed homes and housing unit.

Third: solutions

There is a set of solutions that can be used to resume the investment climate in Nineveh Governorate, based on the immediate steps that involve re-launching public services, repairing and rebuilding the public infrastructure necessary to provide the investment climate in Nineveh.

On the other hand, the best solution to create the investment climate in Nineveh

is to optimally utilize the funds for the development of the regions in repairing and rebuilding infrastructure, and placing these projects among its top priorities. It was noticed recently that a group of projects were referred at a high cost (the dancing fountain, the platform project, the public parks) at a time when the city needs to speed up the reconstruction of the fourth and fifth bridges and begin building the strategic sixth bridge. Therefore, the optimal utilization of the funds allocated for reconstruction requires a set of steps, which are as follows:

- A- Giving a major role to the department of Planning in Nineveh Governorate, because it has been neglected since the time of the former Governor, Nawfal Al-Akoub. This department is responsible for organizing project plans (regional development, stability support project, World Bank projects), as well as providing an accurate and periodically updated database for all existing infrastructure facilities or those to be repaired, developed or created in the governorate. During the administration of the former governor of Nineveh, Atheel al-Nujaiifi, this department played a major role in drawing up and planning infrastructure projects and the governorate's need for service and strategic projects within plans drawn by a team of engineers distinguished by scientific and practical competence, in coordination with the Planning Committee of the Nineveh Governorate Council and the Ministry of Planning.
- B- Accelerating the implementation of the basic design of the city of Mosul for more than seven kilometers in order to prepare an investment opportunity that is directly included in the new design with an area no less than 20 dunums, in coordination with the concern departments.
- C- Opening investment and facilitating investor procedures in a number of infrastructure projects such as electric power production, hospitals and hotels.

The natural component of Nineveh Governorate:

Natural resources are one of the most basic and important factors that affect the power of the state, and that the state's ability to exploit them is more important than just owning a reserve in order to eventually lead to increased production and thus give the state a distinct regional and international position. The state's strength is measured by the size and diversity of its economic output. And the per capita share of it and the extent to which it is related to technological progress and to achieve a geopolitical weight for the state among other countries. Among the most

important natural components of Nineveh are the following:

1- **Geographical location:**

Nineveh Governorate is located in the northwest of Iraq and is 402 km away from the capital, Baghdad. It shares its external borders with Syria and is very close to the tri-border area between Iraq-Turkey-Syria at the point where the Tigris River enters Iraqi territory, and it shares its internal borders with five Iraqi governorates; It is each of Dohuk, Erbil, Kirkuk, Salah al-Din and Anbar, and its area is (37,323) thousand / km², which is equivalent to (8.6%) of the total area of the Iraqi state, and thus it is the third province in terms of area after Anbar and Muthanna.

Nineveh Governorate consists of nine districts, and the Tigris River penetrates the governorate from its northwest to its south, dividing it

into two parts of varying size and area. The left of the governorate constitutes (17.58%) of its total area and includes the districts of Sheikhan, Tel Kaif, Hamdaniya and Makhmour, or what is known as (Nineveh Plain), which are areas with fertile lands and abundance of agricultural crops, especially strategic crops, As for the right side of the governorate, it constitutes (82.42 percent) of its total area and includes the districts of Tal Afar, Sinjar, Ba'aj and Hatra. while the district of Mosul is the center of the governorate, which is divided by the Tigris River into two sides, the left and right of the city of Mosul⁸.

According to the local conflict between the central government and the Kurdistan government, the governorate is divided into parts of it that are considered (disputed lands) distributed between the districts of Sinjar, Tal Afar, Tel Kaif and Sheikhan whose borders are in dispute with the governorate of Dohuk and the districts of Hamdania and Makhmour as a disputed border with the governorate of Erbil, and thus represent a major rift and a real problem that threatens the security of city and its stability.

8. Jawad Saleh Mahmedi, "The geopolitical importance of Nineveh Governorate and its impact on the conflict around it after 2014 AD", Karbala University Scientific Journal, Vol. 16, No. 2, (Karbala: Karbala University, 2018), p. 117.

Table (5): Nineveh Districts According To Their Areas

	District name	Area/km	Area ratio to the total area of the governorate
1	Hatra	9738	26.1%
2	Ba'aj	9172	24.5%
3	Mosul	4471	12.1%
4	Tal afar	4453	12.1%
5	Sinjar	2928	7.8%
6	Makhmour	2829	7.5%
7	Sheokhan	1333	3.5%
8	Tel kaif	1244	3.3%
9	Hamadaniya	1155	3.1%
Total		37323	100%

Source: Ministry of Planning, Annual Statistical Group, 2012–2013.

2- Economic fundamental:

Nineveh Governorate has important fundamentals on the economic level capable of providing and achieving something in the context of our talk about the reality of investment in the governorate, despite what the governorate's economy experienced from a semi-economic recession after 2003 and the subsequent events of the terrorist gangs of ISIS and its occupation of the governorate in 2014, where Several factors combined to play a role in the transition of the governorate's economy to a low stage .⁹

The natural resources that the governorate stores are one of the most important empowering of its economic strength, led by oil and sulfur, as the governorate is

9. Muhammad Wael Al-Qaisi, "Development and Investment: Requirements for the Next Phase, Nineveh Governorate as a Model", Policy Paper, Noun Center for Strategic Studies, (Erbil: Al-Ghad Foundation, 2017), p. 3.

characterized by the presence of good oil fields, but their production is not at the required level and constitutes an extension of the oil-producing fields of Salah al-Din, Erbil and Kirkuk governorates. As for sulfur, “the reserves of Al-Mishraq Fields 1, 2 and 3 located in the south of Nineveh Governorate are estimated at 354 million tons out of the world’s total reserves of 600 million tons of sedimentary sulfur.”

Table (6): Oil Fields In Nineveh

Fields	Geographical location	Total reserves	Production
Ain Zalah	Ain Zalah	900 million barrels	100.000 barrels/day
Qayyarah	Qayyarah sub district	800 million barrels	120.000 barrels/day
Batma	South-east Ain Zalah	800 million barrels	20.000 barrels/day
Safiyyah	On both sid of Iraqi –Syrian borders	700 million barrels	10.000 barrels/day
Najmah	South of Nineveh governorate	900 million barrels	100.000 barrels

Source: Abdul Razzaq Khalaf Al-Tai, The Oil Industry: Reality and Ambition, Journal of Regional Studies, No. 26, (Mosul: 2012), pg. 69.

On the other hand, the governorate has vast areas of agricultural land, which are characterized by their fertility and suitability for cultivation, and heavy agricultural production creates a good possibility for the localization of many agricultural industries, whether those that fills local consumption or export. The governorate is ranked the first place in terms of the production of the wheat crop, which was estimated at (1427) thousand tons, representing (22.7%) of the total production

in Iraq for the year 2020, in addition to the production of the barley crop, as the governorate ranked first, which was estimated at (1360) thousand tons, or (77.4%) of the total production in Iraq for the year 2020.¹⁰

3 The human component:

National human resources play a prominent role in the economic development of the state, as the number of the governorate's population is (382,8197),¹¹ according to the estimates of the Ministry of Planning for the year 2020, so the labor force constitutes an important point in strengthening the economic power of the governorate, as it is known in Nineveh that it is rich in scientific competencies. A high-level thinker capable of providing something fruitful by combining efforts and containing them within the work environment of important and targeted strategic projects.

10. Republic of Iraq, Ministry of Planning, Central Statistical Organization, Annual Statistical Group for the year 2020.

11. Republic of Iraq, Ministry of Planning, Directorate of Population and Manpower Statistics, Iraq population estimates for 2019.

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Raising Iraq's credit rating through government reforms

Mohamed Tariq

Introduction

Iraq faces several challenges, at various levels, and the volume of these challenges increases with each crisis the country is going through, and perhaps the two financial crises of Daesh in 2014 and Covid pandemic in 2020 had the greatest impact on the Iraqi economy, especially public finances, which is dependent on oil revenue as a main source of financing its expenditures.

The significant decline in oil prices after mid-2014 called for Iraq to seek funding from various external parties, and this was for two main reasons, the first to finance the war on Daesh, and the second to finance the main governing expenditures. In the context of these challenges to obtain financing, Iraq was forced to conclude financing agreements with international institutions, led by the International Monetary Fund, which was represented by the credit readiness agreement issued in early 2017, and the previous assessment of Iraq's credit rating by various international rating institutions.

Usually, these ratings measure the creditworthiness of countries, with the aim of obtaining loans and financial and banking facilities from various institutions, and these ratings are used by lenders such as sovereign wealth funds, pension funds, and other investors, and they have a significant impact on borrowing costs and facilities that borrowing countries seek.

Iraq was subjected to the credit rating according to international agencies for the first time in (2015) by the international agencies (Fitch) and (Standard & Poor's), which was low credit due to the gravity of the risks that threaten the country. In (2017), Iraq was rated for the third time by Moody's International Agency (Rasheed, 2020: 14), and Moody's credit rating stood at (Caa1) with a stable outlook as well.

From this point of view, this paper will explore and discuss the various credit ratings and their importance and the most important rating institutions, as well as proposing a set of procedures and policies that would raise Iraq's credit score or

at least prevent it from declining to lower levels, in order to facilitate obtaining financial cooperation with financial institutions when necessary easily and at acceptable interests.

Credit rating

A- A brief history

The business environment, especially the financial one, is characterized by change and development, which makes it characterized by high risks that it can be exposed to. Hence the need for governments, financial institutions, lenders, investors and businessmen for reliable and accurate information that assesses the size of the risks before lending to governments, companies and individuals; Therefore, global rating institutions emerged to bridge the gap between the two parties and provide this information through the credit rating.

Credit rating activity appeared in the United States in the nineteenth century, as the 1837 crisis led investors to sense the need to assess the creditworthiness of companies (their ability to pay their debts), and thus the first credit rating agency in New York appeared in 1841, the “Merchant Agency”.

According to writers and other specialists, the emergence of the credit rating dates back to the beginning of the twentieth century, and John Moody was the first to issue creditworthiness indicators when he used them in the process of grading bonds issued by the railway company in the United States of America in 1909, after which the classification of governments, institutions and Bonds were spread widely, and by 1929, Moody’s Investors Service, founded by John Moody, one of the most important credit rating agencies in the world, was rating 50 governments that issue bonds to lend internationally, while credit ratings for individuals began in the 1950s.

During the 90s of the twentieth century until now, the activity of credit rating has increased, and its types have increased, and there are many local, regional and global agencies that carry out the credit rating process and issue credit ratings, as their number has reached more than 150 credit rating agencies world,. The most prominent of these agencies are Moody’s Investors Service, Standard & Poor’s, and Fitch Ratings, each of which is active in evaluating the ability of countries, companies and financial institutions to meet their financial obligations on a periodic basis in more than 100 countries.

B- What is the credit rating?

Credit rating is defined as a process aimed at providing information and independent assessment regarding the suitability of the financial institution and its ability to perform its contractual obligations, or the quality of financial securities or products, and at the same time, the rating is not a guarantee of the institution's ability to meet its obligations. (Ahmed, 2013: 54)

Credit rating, also called solvency or creditworthiness, is a degree that shows the opinion of global credit rating agencies on the ability and eligibility of a country or institution to borrow and repay its debts. By raising the interest on the borrower or refusing to give it to it, High rating makes it easier for governments and companies to obtain financing, loans and sell bonds, whether from internal or external markets, and the classification process is based on complex economic and accounting criteria, the most important of which is profitability, then assets, and financial flows that illustrate the financial position of the institution. (Mohammed, 2016: 1)

The for credit rating agencies, means private companies that issue assessments of the so-called creditworthiness of a particular country, institution, or bank. The evaluation they give is either positive or negative (Al-Ahmad and Abdul Karim, 2017: 266).

What is the benefit of credit rating?

The importance of obtaining a higher credit rating lies in the amount of interest that the debt issuer (the bond) or the borrower must pay, and here two cases appear:

The first case: the higher the credit rating, the lower the interest rate.

The second case: the lower the credit rating, the higher the interest or the cost of debt that is required to be paid by the issuer.

The importance of obtaining a higher credit rating also lies in the number of investors who want to buy a particular debt issue, given that many financial institutions and investment funds invest only in debt instruments with a high credit rating; Therefore, lowering the rating for a particular issue necessarily means lower demand for it and the difficulty of covering it, given the reluctance of these funds and financial institutions to buy and invest in it.

C– The most important types of credit ratings and their determinants:

There are many types of credit ratings by dividing them according to several criteria, including (the time period criterion, the rated tool criterion, the rated entity criterion, the rating requester’s criterion), but the focus is on studying the two most important types of these ratings, where the first type relates to the sovereign credit rating of its great importance being the key to other credit ratings, the second type is specific to the credit rating of banks as an example of one of the most important types of financial institutions, namely banks. (Maarouf, 2013: 24) (Ahmed, 2013: 56)

1 – Sovereign credit rating

The sovereign credit rating is defined as the opinion of the credit rating agency in evaluating the future state of the sovereign financial ability and its desire to meet its financial obligations in full and on time. Credit rating agencies use quantitative and objective criteria to determine sovereign credit risk and issue a sovereign credit rating score.

The sovereign credit rating reflects the risks of the country not repaying its debts in the stock market, and therefore the government’s failure to pay its debts to other governments, and international financial institutions such as the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank, does not lead to reducing the degree of the sovereign credit rating to the degree (D), which is degree of non-payment; This is because it takes into account when analyzing the sovereign credit rating other information related to the willingness to repay outstanding debts, as well as financial solvency; Therefore, the sovereign credit rating does not take the degree (D) until after the credit rating agency is sure that the state of financial deficit has already been achieved and can no longer be avoided, and that it is not caused by the sovereign state’s unwillingness to pay its due debts.

2– Credit rating of banks

The degree of credit rating of banks expresses the opinion of the credit rating agency on the extent to which the bank may enter financial difficulties, and thus the extent to which it needs support and financial assistance in the future. A meeting is held with the senior management of the bank with the aim of obtaining general information about the various activities of the bank and discussing, evaluating

and analyzing the submitted data in order to decide credit rating procedure. After that, a draft report is prepared and presented to the bank to make appropriate amendments, after which those amendments are distributed to committees. The final credit rating announced the bank officially, to be then published to investors and the public in various media, press news and online websites.

D- What are the most prominent credit rating agencies?

There are many credit rating agencies around the world, but there are three companies in particular called the Big Three, “Standard & Poor’s”, “Moody’s” and “Fitch”, all of which are American companies. (Ahmed, 2013: 56)

1- Moody’s Investors Service

It is considered one of the most important sources of credit ratings. It also provides research data and analytical tools to assess credit risks. More than (2,400) institutions around the world benefit from it, and it employs nearly (4000) employees, including more than (1000) credit analysts. Moody’s performs the following credit ratings:

100	sovereign credit rating
12000	corporates rating
29000	Rating of public financial bonds
96000	Rating of high-risk complex financial products

2- Standard & Poor’s Agency

It is one of the most important credit rating agencies in providing information on global financial markets to investors wishing to make the best investment decisions, by providing them with credit ratings, risk assessment and various researches related to investment. It has more than (9,000) employees, and its offices are distributed in (23) Countries around the world began issuing credit ratings for securities in the year (1922), when they issued more than one million credit ratings, and classified more than 23 trillion US dollars of debt, and also owns one of the most important US stock indexes (S&P500).

3– Fitch Ratings Agency

Fitch is one of the most important providers of credit ratings in most global financial markets, covering more than (150) countries around the world. It was established as a result of the merger of Fitch and Epica in 1997, and then the merger with Duff & Phelps and Thomson Financial Watch Bank in the year (2000).).

Standard & Poor’s and Moody’s control the rating of more than 80% of the debt issuance around the world, whether companies, governments, municipalities and local governments, while “Fitch” is relatively less reputable, compared to the other two companies, and in general, the three companies control It holds between 90 and 95% of the debt issuance market in the world.

The control of these three companies is due to a decision issued by the American Securities Commission in 1975, considering these companies as approved companies by it, in addition to their long experience in the credit rating industry, and their large material and human capabilities, and their increasing fame was derived from being almost the only one capable of conducting all types of Credit ratings, including sovereign ratings, the classification of various types of debt, and complex financial products with high risks, as well as their wide spread in a large number of countries in the world, as many financial institutions and insurance companies invest only in bonds with a high credit rating, the easiest way for bond issuers to prove their creditworthiness is to obtain a credit rating from one or two of these three companies, so that these three companies become more like monopolistic institutions for credit ratings around the world. (Mohammed, 2016: 2).

E– Determining factors of credit rating

Rating agencies depend on several factors, including quantitative and descriptive ones, to perform the credit rating and extract the credit rating index. To the difference between agencies in rating, and on the other hand, there are a set of factors that all credit rating agencies agree on, which are as follows: (Maarouf, 2013: 17–18)

1. Per capita gross national product

This variable reflects the government's ability to meet its obligations with debt service, and this variable primarily reflects the ability of the tax system in the country to generate the revenues needed to spend on various items, including of course loans and debt service, and also reflects the extent of political stability of the country concerned in an indirect way.

2. GDP growth rate

It indicates a stable, positive and high growth rate and indicates a greater ability of the government to pay.

3. The rate of inflation

And the high rate of inflation Indicates the existence of structural imbalances in the economy and the government's inability to finance the loan.

4. Setting the general budget

The budget deficit is evidence of the government's inability to pay and the tax system's inability to generate what is needed to cover expenditures.

5. Status of the external scale

The emergence of a deficit in the external balance indicates the dependence of both the public and private sectors on financial resources from abroad, and if the deficit turns into a chronic deficit, this is evidence of a fundamental imbalance in the economic structure, which requires broad economic reform programs.

6. Economic development situation

Although this change can be measured by per capita GDP, the International Monetary Fund publishes a classification of developing countries according to the degree of industrialization in the economy.

7. Historical review

To verify the risk of non-payment, the review is made whether the country has a history of non-payment, especially in the recent past, as this is evidence of an increased risk of non-payment. (Arab Economic Blog, 2020 Internet)

H- Credit rating grades

International credit rating agencies use alphabetic characters to denote credit quality, which falls within two types of credit risk level (Ahmed, 2013: 55), as follows:

- Investment Grade: It is an indicator of the low degree of credit risk, and takes the symbols (Baa, A, Aa, Aaa) for Moody's, and the symbols (A, AA, AAA, BBB) for the rating agencies Standard & Poor's and Fitch.

Speculative grade: It is an indicator of the high degree of credit risk. It takes the symbols (C, Ca, Caa, B, Ba) for Moody's, and the symbols (C, CC, CCC, B, BB) for Standard & Poor's and Fitch for rating agencies.

That is, the creditworthiness starts from AAA as the highest credit rating down to the lower ratings through the letters AA, A, BBB and so on to the C and D rating, as the following table shows:

Credit rating agencies also add numbers or signs to the right of the rating score to denote the level of credit quality within each rating grade, where Moody's adds numbers for credit ratings from Aa to Caa are 1, 2 or 3, and the number (1) indicates the higher end within The rating degree, the number (2) on the middle of the rating degree, and the number (3) to the lower end of the rating degree. While Standard & Poor's and Fitch Ratings add (+) or (-) to the credit rating grades from AA to B to express the level of credit quality within it.

The levels of investment and speculation within the different credit rating grades according to Moody's, Standard & Poor's and Fitch Ratings can be illustrated through Table (1).

The symbols used by credit rating agencies to denote the level of credit quality in the long period (Hashem, 2019: 24-25) and (Mohammed, 2013: 4) are as follows:

- a- Long-term credit ratings that reflect the rating agency's opinion of credit risks with a maturity of one year or more, and identify the possibility of non-fulfillment of long-term financial obligations.

Table (1): Long-Term Credit Rating Scores:

An explanation of the symbols used by international credit rating agencies			
Moody's	Fitch	P&S	Discription
Aaa	AAA	AAA	very high security
Aa1	+AA	+AA	High creditworthiness
Aa2	AA	AA	
Aa3	-AA	-AA	
A1	+A	+A	Medium to high creditworthiness
A2	A	A	
A3	-A	-A	
Baa1	+BBB	+BBB	Medium to below average creditworthiness
Baa2	BBB	BBB	
Baa3	-BBB	-BBB	
Baa1	+BB	+BB	non-investment
Ba2	BB	BB	
Ba3	-BB	-BB	
B1	+B	+B	Risk
B2	B	B	
B3	-B	-B	
Caa1	+CCC	CCC	High Risk
Caa2	CCC		
Caa3	-CCC		
CA			

An explanation of the symbols used by international credit rating agencies			
Moody's	Fitch	P&S	Discription
C		DDD	Faltering
		DD	
	D	D	
WR		NR	Unclassified

Source: Ahmed, Madani (2013), The Role of Credit Rating Agencies in the Crisis Industry in the Financial Market and the Requirements for Reform, Academy Journal for Social and Human Studies, No. (10), p. (55). and <https://countryeconomy.com/ratings/iraq>

Iraq’s credit rating

Iraq entered the credit rating according to international agencies for the first time in (2015) by the global agency (Fitch) and got a (B-) rating, then (Standard & Poor’s) in (2015) and gave it a (B-) degree as well, due to the reason This low credit rating was given to the seriousness of the risks that threaten the country, and in (2017) it was entered into the rating by Moody’s International Agency (Rasheed, 2020: 14).

The credit rating of Iraq, according to Standard & Poor’s, stands at (B-) with a stable outlook. Moody’s has assigned Iraq’s credit rating at (Caa1) with a stable outlook, while Fitch Agency last announced its credit rating for Iraq at (B-) With a negative outlook in general, the credit rating is used by sovereign wealth funds, pension funds, and other investors to measure the creditworthiness of Iraq and therefore has a significant impact on the borrowing costs of the Iraqi government, and the table below includes the sovereign credit rating of Iraq As mentioned by the three major credit rating agencies.

Table (2): Credit Rating Of Iraq

Agency	Ratin	Outlook	Date
Fitch	-B	Stable	2021/ 3
Standard & Poor's	B-/B	Stable	2/2021
Moody's	Caa1	Stable	12/2020
Fitch	-B	Negative	4/2020
Moody's	Caa1	Stable	7/2019
Fitch	-B	Stable	7/2019
Moody's	Caa1	Stable	1/2019
Fitch	-B	Stable	7/2018
Fitch	-B	Stable	12/2017
Moody's	Caa1	Stable	8/2017
Fitch	-B	Stable	3/2017
Fitch	-B	Negative	9/2016
Fitch	-B	Negative	7/2016
Fitch	-B	Negative	3/2016
Standard & Poor's	-B	Stable	9/2015

It should be noted that the last sovereign assessment of Iraq for Fitch Agency, according to what was published on its website on 3/24/2021, is (-B), with the future outlook of Iraq modified from negative to stable, as well as its assessment of international bonds worth (1) billion US dollars. At an interest rate of (6.75%) with a maturity date of March 23, 2023, the grades obtained by Iraq according to rating agencies, including (S&P) agency in (2016), after evaluating the most important files approved by agencies to place the sovereign rating are as follows: (Al-Murshidi, 2017 :58).

Table (3):Aspects Of The Credit Rating Of Iraq

1-Financial evaluation, budget performance: poor	1- Institutional and political evaluation: weak
2-Financial assessment, debt: neutral	2- Economic evaluation: poor
3-Critical evaluation: poor	3- External evaluation: neutral

We also note that Iraq has achieved the degree of impartiality in the two files, the external file and the debt file, bearing in mind that neutrality is within three points, and the weak is less than three points, and that one of **the most important reasons for these weak ratings are:** (FITCH, 2020 1:) and (Al-Murshidi , 2017: 60).

1- The impact of low oil prices on Iraq’s public and external finances, near-term uncertainty regarding the sovereign financing plan and restrictions on the ability of policy makers to respond to the financial crisis, as the drop in oil prices represents a seismic blow to Iraqi finance.

2- . The current status of the interim government, the background to large-scale protests, the deteriorating security situation and greater dysfunction among the political elites all complicate policy responses to the shock.

3- Budget deficit to high percentages in relation to GDP

4- The Iraqi Prime Minister’s statements that the government may struggle to pay the salaries of public sector employees in the near term.

5- Difficulties in establishing permanent institutions in Iraq due to the existing divisions between the different sects in the country.

6- The authorities have not yet responded to the oil price shock with a financing plan, which leads to an increase in the deficit.

7- The balance of Iraq’s debts from the debts inherited from the eighties of the last century, which does not face any pressure to pay them or serve them.

8- An expected decrease in oil exports, in implementation of the OPEC agreement, budget spending will decrease, by an expected 30%, in response to the

decline in revenues and the limited availability of financing, and this would reduce current and capital spending.

9- Increasing employment in the public sector, as the volume of employee compensation reached (54) trillion Iraqi dinars in the general budget for the year 2021, which is approximately (20% of GDP).

10- The sensitivity of the Iraqi budget revenues to the price and volume of oil is great, given the dependence on oil, which represents 85% to 90% of financial revenues.

11- The agencies expect that Iraq will resort to financing the Central Bank to meet its budget deficit, as happened in previous years when the Central Bank of Iraq financed 16 trillion Iraqi dinars from treasury bills, as the late banking sector is not in a position to provide much financing.

12- Weak political institutions lead to the creation of an unstable political environment, and its low level of debt service in the required time.

13- High risks of the collapse of political institutions due to extensive local conflicts and disputes

14- The implementation of contracts is uncertain and the rules of law are not respected.

15- Weak transparency due to data gaps and frequent amendments, and high levels of administrative and financial corruption in political institutions.

16- Iraq's score is the lowest among all the sovereign countries classified by Fitch on the World Bank's Composite Governance Index, and this not only reflects insecurity and political instability, but also corruption, government ineffectiveness and weak institutions.

17- Ongoing tensions between the United States and Iran, recurring protests in Iraq, and terrorist threats, as well as the COVID-19 health crisis.

Raising the credit rating of Iraq

Credit rating agencies differ greatly in their rating methodologies, so a country often obtains the same or similar rating score by more than one agency. Credit risks, and these weights differ from one period to another and from one country to another based on the data of that country.

Agencies rely primarily on the credit rating process on analysts' analysis of the available data and information, and they give a wide scope for assessment to determine the state's ability or desire to service its debts, and this comes within the framework of analyzing five main factors that form the basis for determining the degree of sovereign credit rating, which enables During which the credit rating of Iraq was improved after understanding it:

- 1- Effectiveness of institutional and political performance.
- 2- Improvement of the economic situation.
- 3- Dealing with external management, external liquidity and international investment.
- 4- Reform the government's financial performance.
- 5- Raising the efficiency of the monetary authority.

These factors will be dealt with in some detail as agreed upon by (Al-Murshidi, 2017: 50-58), (Hashem, 2019: 27-37) and (Al-Farji, and Al-Dahlaki, 2013: 185-187) and as follows:

1- Addressing institutional and political performance.

Credit rating agencies rely on analyzing and evaluating the institutional and political performance of different governments in evaluating creditworthiness, and this can be achieved through the following:

A- Supporting the stability, effectiveness and legitimacy of government institutions and general policies.

This is done by promoting sustainable growth, through developing sober policies, and building strong institutions that enhance the ability to face economic

and political shocks that the government can face and affect creditworthiness. Rating agencies also rely on reviewing the historical record of the state in how it dealt with previous crises.

This means that governments that are able to develop effective policies that achieve balanced economic growth and are able to implement reforms to meet financial challenges, as well as fight favoritism, neglect and lax performance, and their ability to build strong institutions, capable of predicting and responding to expected future political crises, are given a high degree in The rating, while governments with weak institutions, which means an unstable political environment, and high risks; Because of the possibility of its collapse due to internal conflicts, which could weaken the ability of debt services on time, so it is given a low rating.

b- Enhancing transparency and accountability.

Rating agencies depend on the reliability of the data and information that is published, the extent of the independence of statistical agencies, as well as the extent of administrative and financial corruption in the country, governance indicators, international transparency indicators and government actions in combating corruption, so the government must work to strengthen these indicators to be able to obtain them on a high rating.

C- Reducing the impact of geopolitical and external security risks

Rating agencies depend in their analysis on indicators of political stability, which are based on personal estimates of credit analysts in the agency, or through the use of indicators of political stability for that country, the most important of which are unusual events occurring in the country, and their rate of occurrence such as riots, assassinations, civil wars and gangs, or tension in the relationship With neighboring countries, the occurrence or anticipation of these threats negatively affects the status of institutional and political performance because, from the point of view of rating agencies, it may impose a heavy burden on fiscal policy, and reduce the possibility of investment flows, which means putting the balance of payments under pressure, or it may lead to International sanctions, so the government must work hard to establish security and political stability, reduce crime, and build good relations with countries in the region, especially neighboring countries.

D- Debt repayment culture

This aspect aims to assess the government's interest and the extent to which priority is given to servicing the external debt, avoiding default and rescheduling, and this aspect can be strengthened by reducing the volume of official debt arrears payable to other governments, or international financial institutions, and making a change in the fiscal policy in case of any default. In the country's external debt, for rating agencies to rely on this indicator and review the historical record of delays in payments and financial procedures for each default, if the country has a track record of default, this indicates a lack of rule of law and respect for the rights of creditors, which can lead to more cases defaulting in the future, and thus obtaining a poor rating, so governments should avoid any cases of default, or debt restructuring, and meet their obligations on time.

2- Improving the economic situation

The economic situation is one of the important indicators that rating agencies rely on. Countries with a flexible, diversified and market-oriented economic structure, with a strong revenue base that enhances financial flexibility, will be able to meet their obligations on time, and this can be achieved through three sub-factors: levels Income, growth prospects, and economic fluctuations, and rating agencies depend mainly on income levels and one of its most prominent indicators (average per capita GDP), as the rise in per capita income of GDP is a strong indicator of the availability of a reliable tax and financing base in strengthening Creditworthiness, as well as reflecting the high rate of productivity of economic activity in the country, and thus obtaining a high credit score.

The government must exert great effort and attention to raising productivity, to be able to increase the income of individuals, by permanently improving the gross domestic product, by raising the productivity of public and private sector institutions, and the productivity of the individual worker himself, and giving the private sector the opportunity to play its role in the production process, after it The government provides the appropriate ground and fertile conditions to help achieve this, develop or improve the effectiveness and performance of small and medium enterprises, work to invest in the industrial, agricultural and other productive sectors, and build a productive culture. And its prices, just as it is not in the interest of future generations. Oil income may decrease for any reason, such as developing alternative energy sources, or dispensing with oil in a large way, without economic

diversification and strong alternatives to public finance. We cannot be among the strongest and largest economies in the world, and the best in the field Global competitiveness and this is what we must aspire to.

3- External management treatment: (sovereign currency, external liquidity, external indebtedness)

This assessment reflects the extent of the country's ability to obtain foreign exchange, through commercial transactions (public + private sector), to meet its financial obligations on time, as the outcome of these transactions as a result affects the exchange rate of the sovereign currency in that country, and there are three sub-factors The agencies adopt it in this assessment through their analysis of the balance of payments, the statement of financial position, and external debt, and these factors are the position of the sovereign currency in international transactions, the position of external liquidity, and the position of external indebtedness, as you obtain them as we will discuss below.

A- Strengthening the status of the sovereign (domestic) currency:

It is important to strengthen the international position of the sovereign currency, which is those currencies issued by the state represented by its central bank, in terms of the extent of their use in international transactions, or their use as international reserves, which reflects the strength of the local currency and the credibility of the state's policies and institutions in their work, and among the indicators adopted in This area by rating agencies that if the country's currency constitute (3%) of the total foreign exchange reserves allocated in the world, according to the reports of the International Monetary Fund, or from the countries whose currency has active movement and active exchange in international transactions, i.e. those countries whose currency constitutes more than (1%) of the sales of the global foreign exchange market, According to the World Bank report, these indicators are important in the external assessment of the country. If the levels of external debt are very high in a country, and its local currency has the above characteristics, the risk assessment will be lower when the currency does not have the same characteristics.

Global influence is linked to the strength of the currency, and the growing international influence of the United States is due to the dominance of its currency over trade, finance and sovereign reserves. According to the International Monetary Fund, the dollar still represents approximately 62% of all sovereign reserves, while

the euro represents 20%, and the renminbi (the Chinese currency) less than 2%, and with regard to the Japanese yen, which still represents about 4.5% of international reserves, Tokyo has deliberately distanced its currency away from any international role in order to direct its capital for domestic purposes, and in order to control the exchange rate . (Maidan, 2019: 1).

B- Improving the external liquidity position:

Rating agencies depend in their assessment of countries on the analysis and evaluation of the external liquidity position through a ratio indicator (total external financing needs divided by the sum of current account receipts + the country's foreign currency reserves). The country's total external financing needs are estimated according to the following formula:

(Requirements for external financing = current account payments + short-term external debt within the previous period + non-resident deposits at the end of the previous period + long-term external debt during the current year)

Agencies obtain data from various sources, including the historical review of the balance of payments record, especially the current account, as the agency analyzes the main components of the current account, to determine the strengths and weaknesses, and to know the extent of the diversity of exports and imports of goods and services and its history, and whenever the ratio of primary goods to total exports is less than 39% of a country whose sovereign rating falls within the investment grade (high), also depends on estimating external financing needs through the expectations of the Central Bank when available or from the expectations of the International Monetary Fund or through independent economists, or you estimate those needs in a way Independent based on information about the country's expected imports, for the next two to three years.

As for foreign reserves, they are adopted as one of the indicators of liquidity, because the level of reserves is one of the factors determining the confidence of creditors in the country. This is due to its close relationship to the confidence of creditors, which is proven by historical facts between the crisis of external debt and foreign reserves, as well as its ability to defend the exchange rate and face the difficulties of the balance of payments. The generally accepted minimum safe level for these precautions is that it shall not be less than 29% of the total imports.

c– External debt situation

Rating agencies to assess the situation of external indebtedness depend on the indicator that measures the ratio of net external debt to current account receipts. The importance of using this indicator is to indicate the volume of receipts (receipts) in the current account that are deducted or acquired by the debt service, which can reduce external assets. For the state, if the ratio of net external debt to current account receipts reaches 150% or less, which is a very high percentage, the external evaluation will be within the first two strong categories, but this also depends on what the ratio of external financing needs/(current account receipts + Official reserves) as the rating category decreases whenever this percentage exceeds 50%, and thus the importance of placing the current account in the balance of payments and the structure of foreign trade and foreign reserves is also evident in determining the degree of credit rating.

The fiscal deficit in Iraq is always associated with the balance of payments (current account) deficit. Unfortunately, senior officials and experts are satisfied with describing the problem as the insufficiency of oil export revenues for government spending. Rather, it has become fashionable to compare the value of oil sales with salaries, with a strange omission of the external balance of payments deficit. While everyone knows that oil revenues are almost the only source for financing Iraq's imports, both governmental and private, of goods and services and other foreign payments. The public budget deficit is not new to Iraq, but rather appeared from late 1983 to 2003 through all the years of the siege. In 2009 and since 2014. The deficit of the general budget in all those years was accompanied by the deficit of the external balance, and it is obvious that the deficit in Iraq is double or twin, as it is said, because oil exports are revenues to the government budget, which are, at the same time, all of Iraq's receipts of foreign currency, Almost, except for borrowing from abroad and a little foreign investment. Let us ask, why was the general budget deficit not important to the general public in the eighties, and the answer is simple because the external balance deficit found easy financing by foreign loans at that time and also, in 2009 and recent years because the international reserves of the Central Bank took care of the gap between payments and receipts of foreign currency. (Ali, 2020: 3)

The deficit in the current account, and what it means from the increase in payments in the balance of payments, indicates a structural problem related to the domestic economy, as well as an existing risk of a noticeable deterioration

in external financing, which would damage the country's reputation as a stable country. Nevertheless, rating agencies are making an adjustment. On the external evaluation, in light of the reassessment of external financing needs, and one of the factors that influence an adjustment in the external evaluation is the extent of the country's participation or association with the IMF's programs, because those programs would limit the decline, or bring about a gradual improvement in performance. The external performance of the country is due to the pressure of these programs, the need for external financing, the high cost and what constitutes supportive aspects of external performance. The Agency does not deny that the implementation of these programs was not successful in all cases due to the political challenges facing the country.

Based on what was mentioned above, the importance of the current account becomes clear, which requires makers and decision makers to reduce the deficit through the development of a new economic policy, which lays the foundations for managing the economy, realizes its needs and problems, and establishes a new method of work that achieves positive results in numbers, and reducing the deficit because the state of decline constitutes a strong point, indicating the right direction towards the desired goal, which is balance as a minimum, and a surplus as a maximum, and this can be achieved through several reforms, including reducing customs duties on primary commodities Imported, which are included in local industries, increasing them over other goods, raising the competitiveness of local production against imported products, increasing revenues from tourism, especially religious ones, effectively collecting taxes and fees, encouraging and supporting foreign investment and attracting it by providing a safe environment, and reducing spending as will be mentioned In the next paragraph.

4- Reform the government's financial performance

It is one of the important assessments carried out by credit rating agencies in the context of reaching the appropriate credit rating, which measures the country's ability to meet future foreign debts. By dividing the assessment into two parts (financial performance and resilience of the state) and (debt burden) and they are analyzed separately, the financial assessment will be the average of the two assessments mentioned.

A-Financial performance and flexibility

To assess this part, rating agencies depend on analyzing the government's ability

to mobilize resources internally and externally to pay off its debts through internal liquidity and international investment analysis, financial performance analysis, as well as monetary flexibility, by a measure of the potential change in the nominal public government debt expressed as a percentage Government debt/GDP, and the higher the potential and expected changes in government public debt (as a percentage of GDP), the lower the rating category, i.e. moving from the strongest to the weakest. Financial, represented by the expected government measures in the field of public finance, and the room that this flexibility provides for maneuvering to mitigate the impact of economic recession, or other shocks, maintain a low percentage of debt, and face emergency financial obligations, debt burdens, and this flexibility is evaluated positively and thus adjusting the category Evaluation is one category that is stronger when certain conditions are met, including:

The willingness and ability of the government to increase public revenues through increased tax rates, or through asset sales.

- The government's willingness and ability to reduce spending in the short term, meaning that there is flexibility in spending.

In addition, the availability of one of the negative conditions below may weaken the initial assessment of financial performance and flexibility.

- The limited public revenue base, and the extent to which it can be exposed to fluctuations through its dependence on the extractive industry in general, which exceeds 25% of public revenue, as well as the government's inability to increase tax revenue; Because of the large size of the shadow economy, or the limited tax base, which makes the increase in tax rates ineffective.

- The limited ability to reduce spending, if the country suffers from a decline in basic services for the population, such as education, health, and infrastructure, as this leads to increased spending for a long period of time, and reliance is here on human development indicators (medium, low) issued by the UNDP to the United Nations, or because of the imbalance in the age structure of the population, when the numbers of the population of working age compared to other groups, which reflects the higher expenditure on pensions and health care

Accordingly, the level of flexibility is one of the important factors determining the category of financial evaluation, and hence the degree of credit rating, as it provides the ability for fiscal policy to control the conditions of the public budget.

b- burden of debt

This assessment reflects the sustainability of the debt and is thus subject to a set of measures or criteria, including the level of debt, the cost of debt, the debt structure, and the ability to access financing. However, the initial assessment of the debt burden depends on two important measures, namely the level of debt expressed as a percentage of the net general government debt To GDP, and the cost of debt expressed as the ratio of expenditures allocated to the interests of public debt to public revenues, the lower the ratio of interest payments to total government revenues, the more the debt burden is evaluated in the stronger category (less risky), but this also depends on the scale of the level of debt expressive. If the ratio of interest payments to total revenues falls between 5% – 19%, for example, the assessment of the debt burden will be in the weakest category, if the ratio of net external debt to GDP exceeds 100%, and that The assessment will be in the strongest categories if the ratio of net external debt to GDP is less than 39%, and this means that agencies take into account changes in GDP when loading the debt burden, which is part of the external policy loading. Economic and economic performance, as the burden of external debt decreases whenever a country achieves high growth rates in GDP.

5- Increasing the efficiency of the monetary authority

This assessment reflects the extent to which the sovereign monetary authority is able to support sustainable economic growth and face economic and financial shocks, which leads to support the sovereign creditworthiness, as monetary policy represents an important stabilizing tool, especially for countries facing economic and financial shocks that threaten creditworthiness. The category in which there is an analysis of several sub-factors, determined by interrelated measures and indicators, and the sub-factors are:

A- The state's ability to use monetary policy to deal with local economic pressures through its control over the money supply and local liquidity conditions.

B - The credibility (reliability) of monetary policy as measured by inflation trends.

C - The effectiveness of mechanisms for transferring monetary policy decisions to the real economy, meaning the ability of the financial system and capital markets to influence the real economy, and this depends on the diversity and depth of the financial system and the size of capital markets.

As for the first sub-factor, the measure adopted in the analysis is the exchange rate system and its effectiveness, as monetary policy can address imbalances and address local economic shocks when it has the ability to control the amount of currency used in local transactions, and the exchange rate system adopted affects the ability of the monetary authority to Managing monetary policy effectively, because of the conflict that may occur between monetary goals and the goal of maintaining a certain level of the exchange rate, and the main idea in this matter is that increasing the money supply leads from the start to an increase in real balances and the balance requires a decrease in the interest rate, and in light of openness, the matter It requires a change in the exchange rate to cover the interest rate difference, and accordingly, the more stable the exchange rate, the more impediment to the proper management of monetary policy, and the evaluation category for this factor will be stronger whenever the exchange rates are free, meaning that the evaluation category for this factor will be stronger whenever the exchange rates are free (float) and vice versa at constant price.

As for the second sub-factor, the measures adopted in the analysis are the independence of the central bank (operational, objectives, tools) as well as the prevailing inflation rates, as effective monetary policy requires the presence of reliable institutions and this reliability cannot be measured objectively, but there are certain factors It makes the central bank more reliable (credible), and thus highly effective for its monetary policy, and among these factors is the independence of the central bank. In appointing or dismissing members of the board of directors, as well as isolating the financial impact of it (lending to the government), as independence goes to the independence of goals and the selection of tools, which means the freedom of the bank to determine its final goals and determine monetary tools, setting goals means that central banks are more independent if The goal of price stability is its supreme goal, and defining the tools means the freedom of the central bank to choose the tools available to achieve the ultimate goals.

The assessment of the independence of the Central Bank depends on several indicators, including the period that has passed since the independence of the Central Bank, the nature of the monetary tools used, as well as price stability, the value of the currency. The assessment is at Category (1) the strongest if more than ten years have passed since the independence of the Central Bank, In addition, this category also requires the freedom and ability of the Central Bank to use broad, unconventional monetary tools, which it deems appropriate without the need to

obtain government approval, and among those tools is what is known as quantitative easing, which is an unconventional monetary tool that monetary authorities resort to, even if temporarily. To face financial crises and economic downturn, this tool involves the central bank buying financial assets from troubled banks and private sector companies, to increase the amount of money flowing into the economy, when traditional tools are ineffective, by maintaining market interest rates, and if the monetary authority does not. Having this flexibility, and therefore the ability to use market-based instruments, the assessment of the credibility of monetary policy takes the weakest groups whenever monetary instruments improve. Lydia, or less time has passed since the independence of the Central Bank, and this is linked to a soft relationship with the rigidity of exchange rates.

As for the third sub-factor, and before dealing with the specific measures and indicators for it, it should be noted that the economic literature points to the existence of an influence and a direct relationship between the level of development of the financial system and the diversity of capital markets and sustainable economic growth, by increasing domestic saving rates and attracting foreign capital flows, Especially in light of the characteristics enjoyed by developed countries, and this impact is often weak if the financial sector is late or in the early stages of its development, and the large size and development of capital and markets facilitates open market operations, and rating agencies to assess the development of the financial system and the large size of financial markets depend on the average of three measures:

A - The government's ability to issue long-term bonds in medium amounts in the local currency, and the indicators adopted here are the maturity dates of government debt, how the interest rate is determined, as well as debt acquisition, the shorter the maturity of the debt, and the local banks dominate its possession, the evaluation is towards the weakest category. And the opposite happens if the percentage of long-term government bonds in the local currency increases, and the determination of interest rates depends on the market, and the valuation is in the strongest category.

B - The existence of developed markets for securities, and a developed banking and financial system, as the diversification of sources of financing through the capital markets, or the banking system, reduces the risks of a financing crisis when one financing channel encounters difficulties, and one of the indicators was used here, which is the proportion of liabilities in the currency. It is one of the indicators

that reflects the volume and rise of banking transactions that explains the increase in bank deposits that can be used in the accumulation of assets (investments), and the use of the total deposits indicator (after excluding cash in circulation from measuring the money supply means that semi-liquid assets It is the main source of investment, so it also uses the ratio of total deposits / GDP as a measure of the development of the financial system.

d- The other measure is the market capitalization, which is equal to the total market value of the securities listed in the market (the trading value) divided by the gross domestic product during a certain period. In improving economic growth rates, the high rates of capitalization may give an indication or an idea of the development and size of the financial markets, as the rise in market capitalization rates may be a result of the increase in the value of the shares of listed companies, which reflects the optimistic view of the economy in general and the improvement in the performance of those companies, or that the rise Caused by more companies listing their shares in the market, but nevertheless it should be noted that the large and rapid rise in capitalization rates may be the result of speculative activity that does not reflect the true state of the market.

The evaluation category will tend to be weaker. The more stringent the exchange rate system, the less independent the central bank will be. This is consistent with the indicators of the third factor, including the limited ability of the sovereign government to issue long-term bonds, and lower capitalization rates. The initial monetary evaluation is also subject to adjustments according to rates. Expected inflation, as low and stable inflation is one of the main factors in evaluating the effectiveness of modern monetary policy and its primary objective, because that rate provides an important support for confidence in local currencies as a store of value. For a country that enjoys a low and stable inflation level that averages between 9% and 3%, it has the highest level of monetary flexibility.

In reference to what has been mentioned, work should be done to strengthen the independence of the Central Bank of Iraq and its ability to supervise the banking sector and manage the cash reserve, work to improve and develop the Iraqi banking sector and the stock market, for its important role in the credit rating Iraq, according to international agencies, and the Iraqi government should review and follow up on what financial institutions publish in terms of economic and financial indicators to determine their accuracy.

Recommendations:

1. Strengthening the independence of the Central Bank of Iraq and its ability to supervise the banking sector and manage the cash reserve, work to improve and develop the Iraqi banking sector and the stock market, for its important role in the credit rating of Iraq according to international agencies.

2. Strengthening the government's ability to increase public revenues by increasing tax rates and combating the shadow economy, or through asset sales and control of border crossings and customs, as well as reducing spending in the near term, without compromising basic services for the population, such as education, health, and infrastructure.

3. Reducing the deficit through the development of a new economic policy that lays the foundations for managing the economy, realizes its needs and problems, and establishes a new method of work that achieves positive results in numbers, and reducing the deficit because the state of decline constitutes a strong point, indicating a move in the right direction towards the desired goal, which is balance At a minimum, and achieving a surplus as a maximum, and this can be achieved through several reforms, including reducing customs duties on imported primary commodities, which are included in local industries, and increasing them over other commodities, raising the competitiveness of local production against imported products, increasing revenues from tourism, especially religious, levying Taxes and fees effectively, encourage and support foreign investment and attract it by providing a safe environment, and reducing spending.

4. The government should exert great effort and attention to raising productivity, to be able to increase the income of individuals, by permanently improving the gross domestic product, by raising the productivity of public and private sector institutions, and the productivity of the working individual himself, and giving the private sector the opportunity to play its role in the production process. After the government provides the appropriate ground and fertile conditions to help achieve this, develop or improve the effectiveness and performance of small and medium enterprises, and work to invest in the industrial, agricultural and other productive sectors, and build a productive culture.

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Fragmentation Of Newly Established Parties Post 2019

Karrar Kamona

Introduction

The recent Iraqi protests of October, 2019, seeking rights in response to the perceived lack of services and the economic and political realities in the country. Following that, voices from the social, academic, and religious realms rose up, urging the demonstrators to unite. After the mid-2020 sit-in, protesters began to form political parties in order to engage in political action and move from the stage of protest to the stage of political action, and this did not occur in a vacuum, but rather as a result of their conviction of the importance of the political party and its active role in the political process.

The definition of a party is a group of individuals united in their political orientations, tendencies, opinions, and ideas. Political parties are a necessary factor for political life¹. It is not possible to talk about a democratic system without the presence of parties that officially transfer power through elections. In Iraq, the established political parties dominated state institutions after the fall of the former Iraqi regime in 2003. After that, the protesters demonstrated against established parties and their capacity to find remedies and solutions to the country's problems. As a result, part of them went to establish alternative new parties that would play their professional role in political decision-making and contribute to solutions of complex issues in the country. It should be noted that the Iraqi system adopts consensual democracy that relies on party pluralism and does not depend on the one-party or two-party system. Some may point out that party fragmentation may indicate a solution, given that the dissident cannot work within these parties, but what we are referring to is the large numbers of fragmentation, and this by their nature may cause confusion within these parties.

1. Dr. Muhammad Hassan Dakhil, Political Sociology, Al-Sanhoury Library, Beirut - Lebanon, 2017, p. 249.

Literature review

The problem of fragmentation is known to mean the exit of an individual or group from the party to establish new parties, or to join another party, for lack of establishment or integration. This split occurs for subjective reasons, such as a lack of ideology, a lack of organization, personal motives, differences in principles and goals, or a sense of marginalization and inequality imposed by party leaders or outside forces, such as penetrations and conspiracies being hatched for the parties, and these are beyond the will of the dissidents.

The problem has been studied in the Arab world in Algeria and Tunisia, and there are some local studies at the Iraqi parties' level, such as the Iraqi communist, however, there is still no clear study of the fractures that occurred in the parties emanating from the Iraqi protests in October 2019. The relationship between Arab studies and our study is the similarity of the main factors for the occurrence of fragmentation.

Methodology

A qualitative research method has been adopted, given that the problem does not require the use of questionnaires and statistics. Hence, the researcher conducted interviews with leaders of emerging parties to study the problem accurately. Finally, the researcher examined previous studies, as mentioned earlier, that diagnosed the defect and provided solutions and remedies to eliminate the problem.

Part One: The definition of Political fragmentation

Political fragmentation is the departure of a faction or an individual from one party and joining another one or establishing a new party. The retirement from political work or the so-called voluntary resignation is not included in this concept².

Political cleavages have different images, such as:

- 1- A member withdraws and founds a new party.
- 2- A member withdraws from one party and joins another.
- 3- A wing of an existing party splits from one party and founds a new party.

2. Hazem Omar, *Partisan Splits and the Future of Democracy in Egypt*, The Arab Bureau for Knowledge, Cairo, 1, 2017, p. 36.

- 4- A wing of an existing party splits from one party and joins another.
- 5- Factions from different parties split and form a new party.
- 6- An established political party splintered into multiple parties.

Part Two: Stages of Political Fragmentation

- 1- Opposition to leadership and ideas: This stage starts when members organize themselves to pressure the party leadership to change its positions or strategies on an issue.
- 2- The stage of internal conflict: This is the second stage when the party is divided into different wings and factions because of interests. Party conflicts differ from party competition that takes place within the party's rules and regulations. While the forms of conflict are represented by mutual accusations and verbal abuse that may reach violence at times.
- 3- The widening gap of conflict and splitting from the party: at this stage the conflict begins to take its toll from the base and members and is not limited to the leaders only, and here it becomes very difficult for the party leaders to remedy the problem. The faction's strength represents an important factor in resolving the conflict.

Part Three: Causes of Conflict and Fragmentation

First: Absence of Ideology

Ideology means a set of basic values from which the parties derive their position on political issues and events. It also means a set of political, legal, philosophical, moral, and religious ideals³. Its absence occurred due to the fear of some of the founders of the experiences of established parties. Some of the founders went to work on a clear ideology of the party, but it is not declared like secular parties because such terms have not yet been socially rooted and some are incomprehensible because of the religious concepts spread in society that reject these concepts.

3. Dr. Hafez Alwan Al-Dulaimi, Introduction to Politics, University of Baghdad, Baghdad - Iraq, 1999, p. 221

Second: Cultural Difference

The difference in culture is one of the obvious reasons, given that the specialized academic and average citizens joined the emerging parties. The difference is in the way of thinking in dealing with political situations, resulting in radical revolutionary impulses and in conflict with pragmatisms⁴.

Third: Personal Factors

These factors are divided into two parts: The party leadership personality and the people's personal motives. The party leadership is divided into several forms, the personality of the leader who works to exclude the opinions of others because he had the right to lead the party as the first founder, which in turn led to the withdrawal of some of the other founders. The second form, namely the domination of the oligarchs and the transformation of some parties into oligarchic parties. This has also contributed to the feeling of some members being marginalized in decision-making within the party.

As for personal motives, some people went to benefit from these parties and turned them into storehouses to take advantage of the donations and funds granted by the donors. Some also worked on seeking to reach out to the decision-makers in power to take advantage of political gains, and this made other members feel that the main goal of establishing these parties, which have been substituted for the current parties, is unaccounted for.

Fourth: Regulatory factors

The emerging parties worked on writing clear internal regulations, but they did not work to implement them. They also did not assign duties to members so that they could discuss and address their differences inside the party. There is a clear imbalance in roles, which is due to the novelty of the experience for them, and roles are very important within the party, because the party is an institution, where each individual has a role as part of the system to ensure that the work is completed. However, the struggle has replaced the job in order to reach leadership positions with no regard for the importance of other positions within the party⁵.

4. Boumerah Hasina, Talib Samir, party splits in Algeria, unpublished MA thesis, Mouloud Mammeri University, Faculty of Law and Political Science, Tizi Ouzou - Algeria, 2015-2016, p. 17

5. Ali Said Abdel-Zahra, The Partisan Split (Theoretical Framework), Journal of Legal and Social Sciences, Zayan Ashour University, Volume Five - Issue Three, Jafra - Algeria, 2020, p. 169.

Fifth: Extrinsic motives

External motives play a major role in the emergence of many parties, especially in developing countries that depend on major aid from foreign countries, forcing these countries to adopt the leaders of some parties that hold the reins, for their economic interests, yet the leaders here exonerate themselves in many cases. Sometimes it accuses its dissidents of being people governed by personal ambitions and motivated by foreign conspiracies, while the reality is that the authority seeks to disperse small parties and rewards those who defect from his party.

Sixth: The absence of democracy

Democracy within the political party is considered a basis in the evaluation and commitment of the party, and this comes from the formation of the party program in terms of goals and ambitions. There are two models in Jordan: the Jordanian Communist Party and the Islamic Party, which are known for their commitment to democratic frameworks in the form of decision-making within their parties.

The principle of pluralism and acceptance of difference is an indication of the presence of democracy within the party. Democratic practices may be subject to other matters. If top leaders remain in their positions for long periods, then the phenomenon of dissent may emerge, as well as taking decisions without the participation of its members and officially declaring them without the knowledge of other members may cause the fragmentation of parties.⁶

1. Continuity of leadership in office

It is noted in some traditional and modern parties that they may tend to maintain their leaders, which is an evidence of their cohesion and stability. It is clear that there is an Iraqi tendency that characterizes society and perhaps societies in the region that lack the dynamics of change in the advanced industrial societies⁷, especially since patriarchy is rooted in the mentality of Eastern societies.

6. Collective Action, Political Parties in the Arab World, Lebanese Center for Studies, Beirut, 1, 2006, pp. 123-124.

7. Faleh Abdul-Jabbar, back to the parties? Partisan Logic and Political Transformations in the Arab Countries, supervised by Myriam Katos and Karam Karam, Lebanese Center for Studies, Beirut, 1, 2010, p. 309.

2. The importance of participation in democracy

The importance of political participation in the party lies in turning it into a small state, in which we see that the individual has a large role and can participate in making public policies. In addition to monitoring and controlling the actions of the leadership, and this helps the leadership to be aware of its mistakes and weaknesses, which leads it to overcoming these problems. The participation of individuals makes democracy viable and purposeful, while if their participation is simple and ineffective, it may lead to weak democracy⁸.

In order to find out the extent of the parties' interest in the democratic concept and their understanding of it, as well as understanding drivers for fragmentation, interviews are conducted with leaders, as well as some general questions to understand the mechanisms by which the emerging parties work and their way of thinking. Through the following table, we show basic information about the first-line leaders of these parties, the tables after that show the questions and responses:

Table (1): List Of Participants In The Survey

No. of party leader	Name	Party	Position within the Party
1	Hussein Ghorabi	Al-Beit al-Watani (the National Home)	Secretary-General
2	Mousa Rahmat Allah	Al-Wa'ad Al-Iraqi (Iraqi promise)	Secretary-General
3	Mashreq Al Firaji	Nazel Akhod Haki Democratic Movement	Secretary-General
4	Fatima Al-Issawi	Imtedad Movement	Founding Member
5	Mohamed Raysan	Imtedad Movement	Member of the Secretariat
6	Amira Al Jaber	Independent	Non-affiliated ((dissident

Table (2): Favorite Political System

No. of party leader	Answer
1	Current parliamentary system
2	Current parliamentary system
2	Current parliamentary system
4	The semi-presidential system
5	The semi-presidential system
6	The semi-presidential system

Table (3): Main Political Goal In Iraq

No. of party leader	Answer
1	<p>1- Citizenship is the only identifier for all Iraqis.</p> <p>2-work on building a single Iraqi political nation, and adopting the political solution that represents the Iraqi identity.</p> <p>3. Correcting the path of democracy and adopting a single path to power.</p>
2	New political system
3	Power of government and real opposition
4	<p>1-Returning Iraq to the first ranks among the developed countries.</p> <p>2-Making good economic and political relations with the other countries.</p> <p>3-Limiting and completely preventing foreign interventions.</p> <p>4-Activating the suspended laws and creating job opportunities in the private and public sectors and opening the door to investment.</p>

No. of party leader	Answer
5	1- Eliminating corruption. 2- Working on enforcing laws. 3- Establishment of a state of institutions.
6	Achieving political stability through a comprehensive change of the current system with all its residents and democratic mechanisms.

Table (4): Commanlities With Other New Parties

No. of party leader	Similarities	Differences
1	Political tools and public rules	Ideology and political goals
2	Political objectives, political instruments and public norms	Ideology
3	Public rules	Ideology, political goals and political tools
4	Political objectives	Political tools
5	Political objectives, political instruments and public norms	Ideology
6	Ideology and political goals	Political tools

Table (5): Commanlities With Traditionl Parties

No. of party leader	Similarities	Differences
1	Public rules	Ideology and political goals
2	Political tools and public rules	Ideology and political goals
3	There are no participants	
4	Public rules	Political tools

No. of party leader	Similarities	Differences
5	There are no participants	
6	Political tools and public rules	Ideology and political goals

Table (6): Democracy Meaning

No. of party leader	It means...
1	Multi-party and free elections
2	Multi-party and free elections
3	Strong and stable government
4	Multi-party pluralism, early elections, optimal management of resources and a strong and stable government
5	Multi-party and free elections
6	Optimal resource management

Table (7): Extent of Commitment to democratic values

No. of party leader	Democracy	Transparency	Account ability	Commitment to values	Political culture of Party cadres
1	Excellent	Excellent	Very good	Excellent	Good
2	Excellent	Excellent	Acceptable	Excellent	Good
3	Very good	Good	Good	Very good	Acceptable
4	Excellent	Very good	Very good	Very good	Good
5	Excellent	Excellent	Excellent	Very good	Good
6	Acceptable	Acceptable	Acceptable	Acceptable	Good

Table (8): Fears of Fragmentation

No. of party leader	Do you have concerns?	Why
1	Yes	1. Personal tendencies and conflicts to reach a position. 2. Changing political views.
2	Maybe	The party's course requires a long time to complete a project, which causes a strain on some modern cadres in political work.
3	Maybe	The instability of the majority of the new youth based on political work, and there are those who are looking for a quick and ready rise.
4	No.	We have one thought and one principle that we seek to build Iraq and get it back from corrupt parties
5	No.	
6	Yes	Difference of views

Table (9): Prospect Of Brokering Alliances

No. of party leader	Do you have a desire to have alliance?	What is the level of this desire?	What is the form?
1	Yes	Understanding	A political entity that has an internal system, firm principles and a joint leadership
2	Yes	Advertisement	Centrist, secular and democratic acceptability
3	Yes	Advertisement	A coalition that brings together protest and liberal forces

No. of party leader	Do you have a desire to have alliance?	What is the level of this desire?	What is the form?
4	Yes	Orientation	A coalition under a specific name and clear principles and objectives
5	Yes	Advertisement	Coalition opposing the parties of power
6	Yes	Advertisement	Parliamentary bloc

Table (10): Prerequisites For Party Cohesiveness

No. of party leader	The existence of an ideology is important for the survival of the Party	A regulatory framework is essential for Party cohesion	Outside forces cannot influence the party's internal decision	The party staff has the political view to carry out party tasks
	2	5	1	3
	1	3	4	3
	4	4	4	3
	5	5	5	5
	1	5	5	4
	5	5	3	2

Regarding the ideology, we see that the answers show low levels in some of them and this is clear in Figure (10) and we see in the Imtidad movement that there is a clear difference regarding this part. Mrs. Fatima went with the importance of the existence of ideology, while Mr. Muhammad sees the opposite in Figure (4). We clearly see the ideological incompatibility among emerging parties.

Regarding the political goals, it can be seen that there is good agreement between these parties in this part. However, what is remarkable is the political tools, as some of them have argued that they share the same tools with the traditional parties

(see Figure 5), and it is assumed that some of them find the tools of the traditional parties to be unappealing. Especially given that their mantra is “to change.”

Regarding democracy, we observe that the emerging parties have a strong dedication to and comprehension of their tools, with the exception of Mrs. Amira’s last remark, who is one of the dissident members of an emerging party. She chose a rating of 2 out of 5 because she said that there are lower levels of the existence of democracy, transparency, accountability, and commitment to values. We are in doubt regarding the validity of the actual application of democracy and its tools within the developing parties considering the question raised in Figure (7).

According to the replies in Figure (7), there is an intermediate level of political culture among the party members, and this might be risky. To address this issue, the party members need to have a strong political culture. Regarding personal tendencies, Mr. Hussein’s reaction is shown to us in figure (8), where he expresses his concern about fractures that may be brought on by conflicts over power and personal tendencies. Mr. Mashreq simultaneously replied that some young people desire to ascend swiftly, which demonstrates that there are also personal tendencies.

Finally, Figure (8) shows that the majority of the replies that went with the response “yes and possibly,” and this is typical, which appears that the responses are afraid. It is impossible to speak of a static party in which such fractures do not exist, but all party members and their leaders must prevent this by striving to strengthen the democratic spirit and mature the political culture.

Recommendations

First: Start developing a clear ideology. The lack of ideology inside the party is one of the reasons for fractures, and this supports the idea that there should be a true structure for the party to adopt clear ideas and policies within the ideology it is working on.

Second: Strengthening the spirit of democracy and transparency through:

1. The adoption of periodic and transparent elections that allow all individuals to stand even for the office of the Secretary-General.
2. The adoption of secret voting in order to protect members’ choices.
3. The creations of committees for accountability, whose decisions are binding

on all participants—including the Secretary-General.

Third : Adopting the transparency principle with party members and the general public by seeking their opinions on actions so that personal preferences and singling out the decision have no direct effect on or place in the developing party and referring crucial decisions to a vote to get the members' insight.

Fourth: Offering training workshops to party members so that they have sufficient political and social knowledge to have firm and super practical steps in dealing with incidents, otherwise this will cause a clear split in these parties.

Training workshops with topics such as: Leadership, Measuring Public opinion, Advocacy, Political empowerment, Media appearances, and Public speaking.

Educational seminars on topics such as: Political thinking, Political Sociology, Political psychology, and The history of Iraq and political parties.

Fifth : Training and workshops take place through:

1. Establishing an academy for political development within the party.
2. Partnerships with local and international organizations to conduct training on these topics and engage their members.

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4. Group work, political Parties in the Arab World, Lebanese Center for Studies, Beirut, 1st, 2006.
5. Faleh Abdel-Jabbar, return to parties? The partisan logic and political changes in Arab countries , supervised by Miriam Katus and Karam, Lebanese Center for Studies, Beirut, 1st, 2010; P. 309.
6. Dr. Mohamed Hassan Dakhil, political sociology, Al-Sinhuri Library, Beirut, Lebanon, 2017.
7. Asking direct questions with some emerging party leaderships.


Electoral Boycott: Drives and Solutions

Walaa Al-Garabi

The parliamentary elections witnessed a gradual decline of turnout since the first parliamentary elections held in Iraq after 2003, as seen in chart (1). The active societal forces in the protest movement at the time adopted the boycott option as an organized act of protest against the wrong policies and trajectories of the authority, its corruption and mismanagement of the country and its failure to respond to the needs of citizens. According to Transparency International for the Corruption Index in the world, Iraq ranked 162 out of 180 countries.¹

The long-lasting demonstrations and numerous demands led to Adel Abdul-Mahdi's resignation and assigning of Mustafa Al-Kadhemi, who prepared reform agenda agreed by the parliament in response to protests demands, particularly preparing for early parliamentary elections. Even though a new election legislation was adopted, turnout was weak and low; in fact, these elections were reported to have had the lowest turnout ever, with a boycott rate of 59 percent.

Figure (1): Election Turnout Rates From 2005 To 2021



The democratic return of elections determines the value of elections, which

1. Transparency International.

includes, among other things, that they continue to be “an open field for positive competition between different forces, interests, and ideas... a main means of popular control over the performance of political authority, and then to hold those in Charge accountable²” .

Within every political endeavor, elections take on a unique significance and are seen as both a reflection of social integration into the political structure and a scale of the legitimacy of the dominant elite³.

Elections may take place without resulting in democracy, and there are several historical examples of that. It is enough to think back on fascism and nazism and how they came to power in Italy and Germany to see that elections are not a sign of democracy.

The concept of boycott and its criteria⁴:

To rule out alternative non-participation phenomena like mere boycott, indifference, and inaction, the election boycott as an organized act of protest The following Criteria Should be applied.

First criterion: organization

The absence of some voters from the polls—or even a sizable number of them—does not constitute a boycott of the election. It is not a boycott if there is no minimal requirement.

There are a lot of instances like this. For instance, during the Mubarak era in Egypt (from 1981 until the beginning of 2011), when Turoont frequently stalled at about 20 to 30 percent, a clearly low figure. This tendency might be seen as a disorganized, generalized dissatisfaction with incumbents and the defective voting system (either due to discriminatory parts of the electoral law or due to expected fraud). But it cannot be referred to as a boycott as long as it is uncontrolled.

2. Alaa Shalaby, Karam Khamis, Democracy and Elections in the Arab World, Arab Organization for Human Rights, Cairo 2014, p. 7.

3. Ibid, page (3)

4. Conceptual reflections on boycott. understanding and interpreting boycott in the Arab world. Michael Schmidmayr. Vol. 12. No. 4. Winter 2012.

Second criterion: importance

There is no boycott unless there are substantial actors threatening and ultimately carrying out their request not to participate. The issue of relevance is a thorny one. Quantity can have a significant impact, but it does not necessarily do so. In most situations, quantity is key since only a significant number of political players can coordinate a boycott. Elections can also be boycotted by a single representative, if that person has enough sway over the populace to convert disorganized opposition to the status quo and the incumbents into a disciplined defection. Important actors can come from quasi-political backgrounds as well; they are not need to be politicians (eg trade unions, civil society or NGOs).

Third criterion: Publicizing boycott

A boycott of an election cannot happen if it is not supported by several actions, particularly in terms of communication. It stands to reason that individuals would not be aware of a boycott if political, social, or labor organizations did not publicly call for one. Therefore, in order for demands for a boycott to be effective, they must be distributed through the media or through other means (the Internet may become a more effective instrument here) and must at least get some traction in the region. Since they are aware of this, boycotters are likely to develop a thorough communication plan to improve their chances of success.

Fourth criterion: Opportunities

It is crucial to emphasize that the parties who chose to boycott the elections still have a chance to do so. No opposition party that has been purposefully denied the chance to participate could be seen as engaging in a boycott. This also means that we must constantly consider the feasibility of participation while examining elections that have been declared boycotted, and whether if it was impossible for them to participate or not?

It should be highlighted that electoral boycotts only occur in institutional situations that offer such chances, which often occur during elections (municipal, legislative, presidential elections or referendums).

In systems without such opportunities, no actual interruption occurs.

Logically, boycotts can be observed only in countries that have organized elections. For example, no boycott was reported from Saudi Arabia simply because

there was no such opportunity.

These four points, are descriptions of mechanisms only and ignore the intentions of the interrupters. At first glance, there can be dozens of different motives, but they can all be seen as targeting either the incumbents or the system, and revolve around one central element, legitimacy.

The boycott effectively delegitimizes. The boycott's statement reads: We abstain from voting because we do not want to support a government or system that we believe is unjust or has exceeded its constitutional authority. As was already said, democracies often have a strong legal foundation, in contrast to many authoritarian regimes, and this is likely one of the primary reasons why boycotts actually occur more frequently in governments that lack some degree of legitimacy. Consequently, the flimsy (and sometimes embarrassing) definition might be as follows: Voters are invited to participate in an electoral boycott by well-known political types or social movements that represent the spectrum of society and have the opportunity to cast ballots when they leave the polling places in an effort to undermine the legitimacy of the political system or the government that results from it.

Boycott the elections

For a variety of reasons, including the intensification of the campaign against activists led by the martyr Ihab al-Wazni, the failure to bring the assassins of the protesters to justice, the use of political money, the proliferation of uncontrolled arms outside the control of the state, and the absence of a monopoly on violence, many societal forces and political parties, particularly those that emerged from the protests in October 2019, decided to boycott the elections. These elements play a function in influencing the elections in specific as well as the entire electoral process.

The Most Notable Coalitions and Parties that Boycotted the Elections

1. Two Coalition boycott the elections

- Iyad Allawi, the former prime minister of Iraq, and his coalition, "Iraqi Minbar," have declared their intention to boycott the elections due to the difficulty of changing the political landscape in light of the current national challenges.

This coalition, which has academics and retired Iraqi army soldiers as members,

has a position opposing American and Iranian meddling in Iraqi politics. The National House Alliance (representing the popular movement)

- - The “National House” coalition, which stands for the popular movement that began in 2019 and forced the political forces to hold early elections, decided to boycott the elections after the campaign against activists grew more aggressive and the killers of the protesters were not brought to justice. It has a strong support base in the majority of governorates where there is a movement against the current political system.

2. **Eight political parties are boycotting the elections**

Most prominently, the popular movement is represented by the Communist Party (secular), Republican Gathering Party (Sunni), Turkmen People’s Party, Dawa Party, Interior Organization (Shiite), the Al-Marhala (The stage) party (supported by Al-Kadhimi), and Sons of Nahrain Party⁵.

There is also a large percentage of people who boycott elections for no apparent political reason, but this percentage also includes those who call for boycotts and falls under the criteria we mentioned. This is what happened in 2018 and 2021, when there was a strong reaction from some political, social, and cultural elites, which resulted in a high percentage of boycotts despite calls to support reference and encourage participation.

Particularly for the elections in 2021, certain political coalitions, including the Alliance of the Platform and the National House, declared their party boycotts but gave their constituents the option of participating or not. I view the boycott as a tactical move on the broadest potential to earn gains and achieve goals, and the coalition’s head backed his daughter Sarah Iyad.

In regards to the National House, it declared the boycott since it had not finished the requirements to be registered as a party. However, it kept the door open for its followers to take part. The fact that the majority of National House followers supported the October movement mainly Imtidad movement and Nazel Akhod Haki movement. . The boycott, as a movement, aims to delegitimize the regime by reducing the participation rate, and it has been very successful despite Al- Marji’s (Religious reference) support and encouragement to participate.

5. <https://shorturl.at/gzI46>

The Results are:

1. No matter how low the percentages of fraud, they will always be noticeable, substantial, and significant, which contributes to the perception that the elections were manipulated.
2. The emergence of a frail administration that is likely to fall fast, which prompts the political actors to reexamine the election and political processes and improve their authenticity and transparency.
3. the most crucial of which is to lower the participation rate.

Boycott roots:

1. The state of the current government

There is a large number of people who reject this regime and its outcomes, as seen by demands to overthrow the current administration during the protests in October 2019 because, in their opinion, it contributes to widening rifts and aggravating issues. The current system is seen as a hybrid one, and a hybrid system is one that enacts policies that are incongruous in their content and permits some democratic behaviors in an authoritarian setting⁶.

The report notes that Iraq “transformed from a hybrid regime into an authoritarian regime as a result of the violent strikes that erupted in October against corruption and unemployment⁷.”

The hybrid regime depends on a variety of sources of power, including external ones such alliances with international or regional powers that provide it with financial, security, and even military backing if needed, for its existence and the enforcement of its authority⁸.

Some regimes turn to fictitious sources of power, such as asserting the existence of an external threat that deflects attention from internal problems, or preoccupying the populace with a variety of issues in a way that shifts its priorities, such as imposing economic conditions that force Iraqi citizens to concentrate on their

6. Joakim Ekman. «Political Participation and Regime Stability: A Framework for Analyzing Hybrid Regimes.» *International Political Science Review*, vol. 30, no. 1 (2009), pp. 7–31.

7. Hawkamah Indicator (Hawkamah Center for Public Policies)

8. Bruce K. Rutherford. *Egypt after Mubarak: Liberalism, Islam and Democracy in the Arab World* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2008), p. 20

daily life, or creating internal security threat spots in accordance with the technique of creating the devil and pledge to fight it, so that talking about radical changes in the political system is not possible. In addition, the system's structure depends on certain democratic processes, particularly elections, as a source of legitimacy, giving it strength for permanence⁹.

As for the outcome of the hybrid system, it does not seem clear that this system may be a previous stage of the democratic system or the authoritarian regime.

The most important features of the hybrid system and its essential characteristics can be summarized in the following points:

- Strive to stay in power.
- Rely on the consensus system, not the majority system
- Relying on competitive elections within the framework of electoral engineering directed by the ruling group.
- The lack of a balance in public powers in favor of the executive authority that dominates public policy making.
- The lack of independence of the judiciary and its subordination to the executive authority.
- The presence of a multi-media media focused on providing criticism about the content of government and local policies and does not have great potential for accessing and exploiting information.
- The high rate of corruption related to the distribution of clientelism of the existing system.

2. Political Culture

1. Political culture is defined as a set of shared views and normative judgments held by a population regarding its political system¹⁰. The political culture also includes the details of the identity of the individual and the group¹¹.

9. Ekman J.: «Political Participation and Regime Stability: A Framework for Analyzing Hybrid Regimes.» *International Political Science Review*, vol. no. 1 (2009), pp. 7 - 31

10. Kamal Al-Menoufi, *The Political Culture of the Egyptian Peasants, Theoretical Analysis and Field Study in an Egyptian Village*, Dar Ibn Khaldoun, Beirut, 1980, p. 14.

11. David Robertson. *the penguin dictionary politics*. London penguin books

2. It also refers to a set of ideas and attitudes towards authority, rules of behavior control, government responsibilities, and what people consider rights.
3. Consensus and quotas are a feature of all government formation processes. The winner joins the process by way of consensus and quotas with other parties and blocs in order to reach a two-thirds majority, or half plus one, to move on with the formation of the government.
4. The state of frustration that the citizen has experienced as a result of the government's numerous failures to provide services, find employment opportunities, end unemployment, keep voters informed of their problems and concerns, and fulfill their promises to them, as this has reinforced the phenomenon of alienation among the citizens of this country and the idea that the politician is only interested in power in order to achieve political and financial gains at the expense of the people and their suffering.

According to recent polls, the majority of Iraqis believe that because militias and other powerful groups are anticipated to retain their power after the elections, security and political issues would worsen¹².

5. The public's declining trust in government as a result of state administration's repeated and cumulative failures, the spread of financial and administrative corruption, the weakening of accountability, the proliferation of unchecked weapons, the frailty of the rule of law, and the lack of seriousness displayed by all political forces in addressing pressing issues, whether they be political or economic, instead opting to focus on campaign slogans. According to an IOT poll conducted in April 2021, public trust in the government has fallen to an all-time low, with only 22% of Iraqis trusting it¹³.
6. The political elites disagree on the state's structure, despite the fact that the structure helps to provide a road map for their efforts to consolidate the democratic experience and advance it to the point of democratic maturity. Unfortunately, instead of focusing on creating a united country that would aid in nation-building, their main concern was how to divide up authority and responsibility for non-national goals.

7. _____

12. <https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/ar/policy-analysis/alkhwhf-mn-mrhlt-ma-bd-alantkhabat-hl-syshtl-brmyl-albarwd-fy-alraq>

13. <https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/ar/policy-analysis/fy-hyn-tuzhr-asttlaat-alray-tzaydaan-fy-dm-alrda-hl-sytmkn-alshbab-alshyt-mn-qlb>

3. Political alienation

It is a state in which the individual feels his inability to participate in political life and public affairs due to his feeling of the negative aspects of the existing political system and its institutions. He also believes that politics and government are run by others for the benefit of others in accordance with unfair political rules, and he lacks the political power to change this by voting or joining political parties¹⁴.

The main causes of political alienation are:

- Inadequate standards of democratic transition and lack of confidence in it.
- Not renewing the political elites through the electoral mechanism.
- The failure of government public policies to improve the conditions of citizens.

All democracies share certain characteristics. Regular and fair elections guarantee political participation and representation of the interests of all sectors of society. Transparency allows citizens to monitor the procedures through which their elected representatives adopt and implement public policies. For transparency to continue, it must be a prerequisite that the state does not impede the flow of information. In order for a country to be considered a real democracy, it must guarantee basic human rights to all citizens, such as freedom of expression, assembly, religion and the right to a fair trial. The rights of minorities must be protected. Democracies are only as powerful as the protection they provide to their weaker people, as many democratic thinkers have noted.

A true democratic society is characterized by a high level of political participation and an organized people. Within civil society institutions, citizens are able to exchange information and form patterns of social and political solidarity that protects them from dictatorial authorities. And social justice must be ensured for citizens in a democratic state, despite the habit of ignoring it. The failure of governments that sought to establish democratic institutions has frequently been attributed to their disregard for the requirements of the public's economy. A strong democracy can flourish only in a society that provides great economic opportunity for all its citizens and where education, healthcare, and housing for all are available¹⁵.

14. Halim Barakat, *Alienation in Arab Culture, Human Labyrinths between Rule and Reality*, Beirut, Center for Arab Unity Studies, 2006, p. 13.

15. US Institute of Peace, Eric Davis, Special Report No. 153 October 2005.

Although free and fair elections are one of the mainstays of the democratic system, they are not enough to achieve true democracy on their own. Political pluralism, the peaceful transfer of power, and the separation of powers while maintaining a balance between them based on a clear and solid constitutional reference are just a few of the numerous foundations and components that are necessary for true democracy¹⁶. The capacity of the elected government to govern, the rule of law, the efficacy of institutions and processes for accountability and transparency, the presence of a strong and independent civil society, the guarantee of political rights and civil liberties for all citizens based on equality of citizenship, and the availability of a variety of information sources with open access are all important factors.

With the various levels of democracy and freedom that they permit, the phenomena of reluctance occurs in all democracies. The boycott is an organized, anti-democratic protest that takes place in authoritarian and mixed governments, ignoring the influence governments have on the growth or decline of this phenomena. Because it is connected to democracy and the legitimization of the ruling regime, the high rate of boycott and resistance raises concerns about the future of political work in general. Real and substantial representation of the people is necessary for democracy. This deterioration explains why the populace has lost faith in the political elite's capacity to address their issues and fulfill their goals.

The persistence of protest movements and popular demonstrations reveals that the people experience both problems and are seeing a decline in all aspects of their lives. There is also no serious effort being made to address these issues, and the security forces respond to every attempt by the people to express their discontent and dissatisfaction with the political class by using batons and bullets. Election boycotts and the phenomena of resistance were ways for people to show their disapproval of this situation and convey signals to the political elite.

16. Michael Coppedge et als., " Conceptualizing and Measuring Democracy: A New Approach," Perspectives on Politics, Vol.9. No.2(July 2011

Recommendations:

In order to ensure the highest possible level of political participation and attention to public affairs, especially elections, which represent the most crucial component of democracy, work must be done to restore the citizen's confidence in the political process in general and the electoral process in particular. Additionally, the gap between citizens and the political class must come to an end. Citizens' engagement and involvement in public affairs, which has a favorable impact on the entire political process, aids the newly formed administration in enacting its policies with popular support. Reluctance and boycotts amplify the false assumptions about democracy and lead to weak administrations as a result of a lack of popular support.

To increase involvement, a variety of actions can be taken. Through their voluminous engagement in demonstrations, conversation, and social media commentary on matters of public concern, citizens serve as an implicit desire and a key sign of participation and participation in decision-making. The constitutional and legal provisions that guarantee political and civil rights to every Iraqi citizen, as well as Iraq's approval of UN Security Council Resolutions Nos. 2250 and 1325 on Youth, Security and Peace and Women, which encourage and guarantee both groups' participation in and acknowledgement of their contributions to the security and peace sector, all lend support to this trend. Iraq has approved the two resolutions in the UN Security Council and thus has committed itself before the international community to abide by the terms of the two resolutions.

1. Increasing citizen involvement in decision-making by activating elected representatives' offices in the governorates and implementing the outcomes of conversations between the representative and the public on the policies discussed/ approved by the House of Representatives.
2. The political parties must interact with the electorate both before and after the election, and they must design electoral platforms that fulfill the needs and expectations of the electorate. This will provide people a tremendous incentive to get involved in politics and other public issues in general.
3. The election policy should prevail over the election of politics, because choosing the election policy will give the people the ability to choose a policy that is valid for the country through peaceful mechanisms of democracy, while

the election of politics will lead to choosing a policy that suits the government and satisfies its parties, thus weakening the people's ability to rule, and weakening the rule of the majority. Democracy becomes the rule of the dominant political forces (the minority).

4. Neutralization of political money and setting a specific ceiling for the money spent on electoral propaganda for the purpose of ensuring the principle of equal opportunities and not affecting the voter's will.

This can be done through the text of a charter in the light of the "Indian Model Code of Conduct by political parties, at the National and State Levels".

This charter requires:

Providing equal opportunities for the use of public resources and buildings by the opposition parties in their electoral campaign.

It is prohibited by this Charter:

- The use of government departments and their employees by ministers for the purposes of the electoral campaign.
- Combining official ministerial visits with electoral campaign activities.
- The use of government transportation for election campaign purposes.
- Using public funds to cover the costs of the electoral campaign through the media.
- Misuse of official media for the purpose of covering news and partisan events of a political nature.
- Offering grants and assistance paid for using funds allocated at the discretion of those in charge starting when the elections are declared and called.
- Announcing or initiating public works or carrying out appointments or obligations that may affect the electorate from the moment the elections are announced and called.

Source: “Compliance of Model Code of Conduct by political parties” issued by the Election Commission of India¹⁷.

5. Include as many people as possible in the decision-making process, including unions, associations, and civil society organizations, especially those that are concerned with the daily lives of citizens. Take into account all suggestions and objections without being influenced by the interests of small political, economic, or partisan blocs. Give priority to legislation that is concerned with the lives of citizens to have a sense of protection from the authorities.

6. Limiting unarmed weapons to provide electoral security before, during and after the electoral process. The Iraqi Parties Law must also be activated, which states in Chapter Three, Article Eight, Thirdly, as follows:

“The establishment and work of a political party or organization should not take the form of military or paramilitary organizations, and it is not permissible to associate with any armed force.”

17. Forms of Electoral Management, IDEA Handbook, by Alan Wall, Andrew Ellis, Ayman Ayoub, Carl Dundas, Joram Rukambi, Sarah Steno, Arabization of Ayman Ayoub with a contribution from Ali El-Sawy, International Institute for Democracy and Elections Publication Series Electoral Assistance) 2007, Publications section IDEA International (Strömsborg – SE-103 34 Stockholm Sweden, Box 2, p.: 101.

Towards Promoting African Iraqis Rights

Murooj Mohamed Hassan

Abstract

The integration of African Iraqis is of great importance in Iraqi society, given their residence in Iraq hundreds of years ago.¹ As 36% of Iraqi families of African descent were subjected to racial discrimination, and 31% were subjected to discrimination based on race, the places where this discrimination occurs vary, whether at work, school, or the street. About 72% of African Iraqis cannot marry other components of Iraqi society. 75% of African Iraqis who have been subjected to racial discrimination have a desire to move to other areas inside or outside Iraq. In addition, 43% of African Iraqis with elementary education preferred to stay in their areas. At the same time, those with higher degrees and diplomas wished to change their current place of residence. The motives behind their desire to change residence vary from the experience of racial discrimination, cost of living and rent, availability of better education, and employment opportunities.

Introduction

African Iraqis still suffer from marginalization and the persistence of racial discrimination against them, which prevents them from fully enjoying their rights. Their number ranges between 5.1 and 2 million people, the majority of whom are concentrated in southern Iraq². Iraqi Africans did not enjoy their legitimate rights, and they facing challenges in all aspects of life (social, economic, and political). Over the course of several years, there were attempts by African Iraqis to form social and political movements in order to demand their rights. These attempts crystallized with the establishment of the “Free Iraqis Movement” in 2008 in Basra. It is a civil society organization, which aims to defend the rights of Iraqis of African origin. There have been calls for quotas for representation in provincial elections at the local government level. Despite all of these protests and requests, decision-makers and community leaders have not yet accepted or acknowledged these demands³.

1. Taha Al-Ani. Iraqis of African origin.. Learn about the story of the Africans and their most prominent problems? Al Jazeera 2020 <https://2u.pw/ibnZI>

2. General Assembly, Human Rights Council, Report of the Special Rapporteur on Minority Issues on her Mission in Iraq, 2017, p. 17 <https://2u.pw/lrgWa>

3. Saad Salloum. Al Fanar Media. Afro-Iraqis: Black lives matter also in Iraq. 2020. <https://2u.pw/GWPMY>

This paper is based on a field survey in Basra Governorate, where the highest percentage of African Iraqis population live there. Snowball sampling was used because it was not always easy to reach the sample. A questionnaire was distributed to 384 male and female residents in the Basra city center, Zubair district, Umm Qasr district, and Al-Tanuma area, where data were collected for the period from 16 August to 31 August 2021.

Using the criteria of the Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC) to find lasting solutions for displaced people, including access to health care, education, employment opportunities, safety and security, freedom of movement, decent living standards, and housing⁴, this paper seeks to provide a detailed presentation of the realities of African Iraqis and the extent of their integration into Iraqi society. This is done in accordance with a number of factors, such as gender, education levels, residency, and accessibility to services like health, education, and racial discrimination. The first section of this article presents the demographic features; the second section examines the realities of African Iraqis using the standards of the UN Inter-Agency Standing Committee; and the third section discusses the size of the problem.

Demographic characteristics of African Iraqis:

By examining Chart (1), which shows the sample's gender distribution, we can see that 46% of the sample consisted of men, and 54% of the sample's participants are female. Additionally, 46% of the sample is married while 43% are single. According to Chart (2), this percentage is nearly equal and there have been few instances of separation between sample members. The majority of the sample, as seen in Chart (3), consists of people between the ages of 18 and 25, indicating that the sample's youth population is the largest. Additionally, Chart (4) demonstrates the variation in family sizes, from 1-3 small households or 6-4 medium households, with medium-sized families making up the majority of the sample.

4. The International Organization for Migration in Iraq. Reasons for staying in displacement 2. p. 6.
* The right not to be discriminated against is guaranteed by several instruments directly related to minorities, including the Convention relating to the Status of Stateless Persons, the Convention relating to the Status of Refugees, and the Declaration on the Human Rights of Minorities. The integration criteria were based on the displaced because the principle of international law of non-discrimination is fundamental in international law and is reflected in all human rights instruments.

Figure (1): Gender




Figure (2): Marital Status




Figure (3): Age Group





Figure (4): Household Size



The sample distribution according to geographic affiliation is shown in Chart (5). It shows that 50% of the sample is Located in the city center and 45% in the districts. This may be ascribed to several factors, such as their proximity to family and friends, the availability of better work opportunities, the cost of living, rent, and the accessibility of education and healthcare services, as illustrated in Chart (7). And according to Chart (6), 56% of the sample members are the head of their families.

Figure (5): Geographical Affiliation




Figure (6): Head Of Household




Figure (7): Reasons For Choosing Your Current Residence




Chart (8) shows that 40% (153 out of 284) of the sample do not have a job, and this is a serious indicator of the standard of living for African Iraqis and their right to find a job. According to the most recent World Bank figures, Iraq’s unemployment rate has reached 13.7%, which is a level that hasn’t been seen in decades⁵. Of the other participants who have jobs, 20% work for their own businesses and 10% work for others. Chart (9) demonstrates that the majority are industrial and craft workers or hold low-paying jobs (construction workers and service workers). It is also noted that only (3 out of 284) held the manager position and that the highest percentage of participating women did not work. It is indicated in Chart (10) that most participants got their jobs through relatives, acquaintances, and responding to job office adverts.

In addition, the challenges they face in finding employment can be attributed to a number of factors, as demonstrated by the fact that 11% (44 out of 384) of respondents agree that the lack of political and personal connections and relationships affects job opportunities and that 34 % (129 out of 384) of respondents believe that their low educational level and qualifications are obstacles to finding employment (11).

5. Al-Hurra Iraq. Iraq Unemployment at its highest level in three decades and a report on «the most affected.» 2021 . <https://2u.pw/bb6nZ>

Figure (8) : Work Status




Figure (9): Type Of Occupation




Figure (10): How To Get A Job





Figure (11): Reasons Why It Is Difficult To Find A Job



African Iraqis' Realities:

Chart (13) shows 74% (285 out of 384) of the sample of African Iraqis had problems receiving medical treatment in clinics and public and private hospitals, which shows the evaluation of the quality of health services in their areas of residence. This is due to a number of circumstances, including the poor healthcare services provided, financial limitations, and the distances required to travel to seek these treatments from their home, as shown in Chart (14)

Figure (12): Classification Of Health Services






Figure (13): Reasons For Low Rating Of Health Services



Regarding the level of education held by African Iraqis, we see that 41% (158 out of 284) of the sample were in elementary school, 14% (52 out of 284) had earned a bachelor’s degree, and 1% (4 out of 384) had finished a postgraduate program. It is important to note that the majority of participating women only finished the elementary education stage, as indicated in Chart (15), which indicates a gap in academic achievement seen between genders. Furthermore, due to a variety of reasons, such as a lack of infrastructure and educational institutions, the ongoing conflict, and displacement in Iraq, approximately 3.2 million Iraqi children of school age are not in school⁶.

Figure (14): Education Level



6. UNICEF. Education for children. <https://2u.pw/iNmDN>

80% (309 out of 384) of the participating families have children who have attended school before, as shown in Chart (16), and 79% of the respondents who have children aged 6–17 are currently attending school, as shown In Chart (17). In addition, 73% of children joining informal lessons 3 days a week during the school season. This can be seen in Chart (18).

Figure (15): Children Enrolled In School




Figure (16): Percentage Of Children Currently In School





Figure (17): Children Joining Informal Lessons



It is noted from the Chart (19), that 50% (193 out of 284) of the participating families have a member who has stopped attending school, and 26% (98 out of 384) of those individuals who have stopped attending school are currently working and contributing to the family's income. Moreover, 44% of those who left school are looking for work, as shown in Chart 21.

Figure (18): Families With A Member Who Stopped Attending School




Figure (19): People Who Have Left School And Have A Job






Figure (20): Individual Looking For A Job



African Iraqis were exposed to severe shocks, and the nature of these shocks varies, as 12% (46 out of 384) of the participants faced the death of a family member, 6% (22 out of 384) were exposed to an increase in the cost of rent, and (15 out of 384) suffered from non-payment or late payment of wages, and 21% (81 out of 384) experienced loss or interruption of their employment. And 49% (187 out of 384) of the participants believe they have not been subjected to serious trauma. As shown in Chart (22).

Figure (21): Type Of Severe Shock



Besides, 66% (253 out of 384) of the participating families receive no financial or in-kind aid. And 34% (131 out of 384) received aid. They received several types of support: as 13% got charitable donations and 20% got support from non-governmental organizations. As for the United Nations aid programs, only 1%, as well as 1% for government benefit, as seen in the Charts (23 and 24). This indicates the weak humanitarian support provided to them by governments, civil society organizations, and United Nations programs.

Figure (22): Receiving Cash And In-Kind Assistance





Figure (23): Source Of Cash And In-Kind Assistance



African Iraqis experience racial discrimination, as seen in Chart 25, which shows that 36% (138 out of 384) of the sample experienced racial discrimination. According to Chart (26) 31% say they have been victims to racial discrimination. As indicated in Chart 27, there were many ways in which they were subjected to this discrimination. For example, 18% of them said they experienced it on the street and 11% at school (27). International reports claim that African Iraqis suffer from discrimination in their society.

Figure (24): Exposure To Racial Discrimination




Figure (25): Type Of Racial Discrimination





Figure (26): Place Of Discrimination Event



African Iraqis feel that racial discrimination is pervasive in Iraqi society, according to Chart 28, which displays that 69% (264 out of 384) of participants said that this discrimination is common. Furthermore, as demonstrated by the fact that 48% of sample members who defend this claim do so by mentioning regional traditions and customs, there are elements that contribute to the spread of racial discrimination against them, as is seen in Chart (29). Based on family and societal upbringing, it is possible to identify the causes of the propagation of racial discrimination towards African Iraqis, as shown in Chart (30).

Figure (27): Extent Of Racial Discrimination




Figure (28): Reasons For Racial Discrimination




Figure (29): Who Is Responsible For The Spread Of Racial Discrimination




Chart 31 reveals that 72% (227 out of 384 respondents) feel they cannot marry from other components of Iraqi society. This can be explained by the existence of a variety of elements, including ethnic factors (68%), religious factors, and cultural factors. Sometimes, as Chart (32) demonstrates, there are no obvious reasons.

Figure (30): Marrying From Other Components






Figure (31): Reasons For Not Being Able To Marry From Other Components



In Chart (33) we can see that 40% (157 out of 384) of respondents believe that their Household income covers their expenses and that they were able to save, and 30% (116 out of 384) of respondents believe that their Household income covers their expenses but they were unable to save. For the remaining participants, it appears that 16% (63 out of 384) of the participants' Household income did not cover their expenses and they faced some financial hardship.

Figure (32): Household Income



Additionally, as indicated in Chart 34, 8% (30 out of 384) of the participating families reside in a home or apartment that is owned by the family in sprawling areas, whereas 7 percent (28 participants) do the same (34). Additionally, 32% (122 out of 384) of respondents reported having trouble paying their rent in the previous six months, as indicated in Chart (35). As indicated in Chart 36, some of the participating families were forced to leave their houses since 6% were unable to make their rent payments and 10% had to pay higher rent. This demonstrates the difficulties African Iraqis confront in exercising their right to decent and permanent housing.

Figure (33): Nature Of Housing




Figure (34): Difficulties In Paying Rent Over The Past Six Months





Figure (35): Reasons For Eviction



Despite this, as indicated in Chart 37, 88% (338 out of 384) participating families say they feel safe in their neighborhood. Whereas 95% (336 out of 384) respondents say they are not the target of physical aggression. Additionally, the majority of them own identification documents, as shown in Charts (38) and (39). According to Chart (40), 86% (331 out of 384) respondents said they have freedom of movement in Iraq. Additionally, 86% in these homes think it is easy for them to make friends with other groups in society, whereas 14% think it is difficult. According to the Chart (41), 11% (41 out of 384) of the participants

blamed external factors for their inability to make friends with other components of the society mainly to ethnic factors, and the majority think that there are no motives behind this, as shown in the Chart (42).

Figure (36): Feeling Safe




Figure (37): Exposure To Physical Harassment




Figure (38): The Documents They Received




Figure (39): Freedom Of Mobility




Figure (40): Difficulties In Making Friends





Figure (41): Reasons For Difficulties In Making Friends



The Integration of African Iraqis:

According to the Chart (43) it appears that the majority of African Iraqis do not have firm plans to move, with 80% (308 out of 384) of the sample not intending to leave their current location within the next 12 months, as opposed to 20% (76 out of 384) of the participants who are considering moving. And according to Chart 44, 76% (292 out of 384) of respondents think they have nowhere to go, whereas 15% can change their residence within the governorate. The expense of living and rent, the availability of better educational options, marriage, the experience of discrimination, and the availability of jobs were some of the several reasons why they wanted to move, as appears in Chart (45).

Figure (42): Any Plans For Moving From Iraq Figure (43): Where To Move





Figure (44): Reasons For Wanting To Move



In Chart (46), 24% (99 out of 384) of the participating families had someone forced to change their place of residence and move to another location within the past 12 months. The motives behind this move vary, including joining other family members, relatives and friends, the cost of living, marriage, as shown in the Chart (47).

Figure (45): Having A Family Member Moved To Another Place





Figure (46): Reasons Why This Person Moved



Various motives affect the desire of African Iraqis to stay or change their place of residence, the most prominent of which is racial discrimination that affects the extent to which they integrate into their societies, as we noted that 75% (57 out of 138) of African Iraqis, who have been subjected to racial discrimination, they have a desire to move to other areas. Only 25% (19 of 246) of people who have not experienced racial discrimination are considering moving, as shown in Table (1).

Table (1): The Impact Of Racial Discrimination On Community Integration

Racism	Frequency (wanting to move)	Total	Percentage
Subjected to racial discrimination	57	138	75%
Not subjected to racial discrimination	19	246	25%
Total	76	384	100%

Moreover, family income and savings encourage African Iraqis not to think or want to move to other regions, as 47% (143 out of 157) of people with good income do not want to change their residence. In contrast to families who face difficulties covering their expenses, the percentage of their desire to stay in their areas decreased, as shown in Table (2).

Table (2): The Effect Of The Level Of Income And Savings On Integration Into The Local Community

Household Income	Frequency (wanting to move)	Total	Percentage
Our family’s income covers our expenses and we faced some difficulties in covering our expenses	40	63	13%
Our family income did not cover our expenses and we faced great difficulties in making ends meet	35	48	11%
Our family income covered our expenses well and we were able to save	143	157	47%
Our family income covers our expenses without noticeable difficulties	90	116	29%
Total	308	384	100%

The educational level affects the extent to which African Iraqis families integrate, as 43% (133 out of 158) of people with elementary education prefer to stay in their areas. While those with higher degrees are 1% (2 out of 4) and 9% of those with diplomas (27 out of 43), they were less responsive and wished not to change their place of residence, as shown in Table (3).

Table (3): The Effect Of Educational Level On Integration Into The Local Community

Educational Level	Frequency (Not wanting to move)	Total	Percentage
Illiterate	20	22	6%
Elementary	133	158	43%
Secondary	34	47	11%
Middle school	44	58	14%
Bachelor	48	52	16%
Higher studies	2	4	1%
Diploma	27	43	9%
Total	308	384	100

Geographical distribution is another factor affecting integration, as we find that 52% (161 out of 191) of the participating families who live in the city center and

46% (141 out of 143) of those who live in the districts do not want to change their place of residence. This indicates their integration in their areas. On the contrary, we note that only 1% (2 out of 9) and 1% (4 out of 11) of people who live in suburbs and villages do not think of moving, as shown in Table (4).

Table (4): The Effect Of Geographical Distribution On Integration Into The Local Community

Residence	Frequency (Not wanting to move)	Total	Percentage
Districts	141	173	46%
City center	161	191	52%
Suburbs	2	9	1%
Villages	4	11	1%
total	308	384	100

It also appears that the type of housing is a factor in how much a family’s integration into society is impacted, since 64% (195 out of 229) of African Iraqis families that own an apartment or home in an organized residential area say they have no wish to move. Families in sprawling areas, where 6% (18 out of 30) and 3% (11 out of 28) respectively live, are less likely to consider moving, which can be attributed to inadequate housing, a low standard of living for these families, challenges finding employment, and inadequate humanitarian aid, as seen in Figure (5).

Table (5): The Effect Of Housing Type On Integration Into The Local Community

housing type	Frequency (Not wanting to move)	Total	Percentage
Family owned apartment/house in slums	18	30	6%
Apartment/house for rent in slums	11	28	3%
Family-owned apartment/house in organized areas	195	229	64%
Family owned apartment/house rented in Organized Areas	82	97	27%
Total	309	384	100%

Conclusions and alternatives:

The majority of African Iraqis struggle with poor levels of education, high unemployment rates, and access to quality healthcare and decent housing. Additionally, they condemn racial discrimination and note how pervasive racism is in Iraqi culture. There are many different causes of this discrimination, including societal, economic, and religious ones. Additionally, the majority of them do not receive any financial aid from the government, civil society groups, or the UN aid program, and some of them are subjected to severe shocks like losing their jobs. The majority of them reside in the governorate of Basra's city center and surrounding districts, and their presence in those areas is due to their closeness to family, relatives or friends and for reasons of living, housing and job opportunities. Due to their inadequate qualifications and a lack of employment opportunities, they have trouble finding a job. Additionally, they have easy access to identification documents, feel comfortable moving around, and have no trouble establishing friends with other members of society. Most of them do not consider moving to other parts of Iraq or abroad.

Administrative and Rehabilitation Alternatives:

Training and qualifying Iraqi job seekers of African origin in various fields and linking graduates to the labor market where they are trained and qualified to acquire the skills required by the job applied for.

- Intensifying efforts to promote national reconciliation in order to build trust and build bridges between groups and sects and to ensure their full participation in these efforts, and work in this regard to implement school curricula reforms in order to disseminate the principles of tolerance, equality and human rights.

- Planning educational and informational efforts to raise awareness in an effort to restore the dignity of people of African origin.

Financial alternatives:

- The Iraqi government should take the required steps to boost people of African origin access to high-quality health services since it can set up clinics that offer medical and health services.

- Adopting a national plan to ensure that children and young people have access

to education without discrimination by making it available in areas inhabited by groups of African origin, especially marginalized communities, where free educational lessons can be organized, and taking measures to increase the number of African teachers in educational institutions.

- Building housing projects and providing financial loans aimed at ensuring that African Iraqis own housing within the local community

- Local governments should provide funding, assistance, and basic support in humanitarian and development fields to the affected groups of African Iraqis.

- The Iraqi government must allocate the necessary resources to improve their conditions and meet their needs through projects that achieve sustainable solutions and development in their community.

- The government shall sponsor small-scale initiatives in industry, agriculture, and services that are aimed at African Iraqis.

Legal alternatives

To guarantee that they are represented in local governments, provincial councils, and the Iraqi parliament, minorities of African origin should be given a quota comparable to what was given to Christians, Mandaeans, Yazidis, and Shabaks.

The necessity of enacting laws criminalizing racism in all its forms, and enacting a law for the protection of minorities targeting African Iraqis.

Recommendations:

1. The Iraqi government should take the necessary measures to improve access to quality health services for people of African descent, as it can establish centers or points that provide medical and health services.
2. Building housing projects and providing financial loans aimed at ensuring that African Iraqis obtain housing within the local community.
3. Local governments should provide basic funding, assistance and support in the humanitarian and development fields to the affected groups of African Iraqis.
4. Intensify efforts aimed at promoting national reconciliation in order to build confidence and build bridges between groups and sects and ensure their full

participation in these efforts, and work in this regard to implement school curricula reforms in order to disseminate the principles of tolerance, equality and human rights.

5. The Iraqi government must allocate the necessary resources to improve their conditions and meet their needs through projects that achieve sustainable solutions and development in their community.
6. The Iraqi government should take all necessary measures to ensure that children and young people have access to education without discrimination by making it available in areas inhabited by groups of African origin, particularly in marginalized communities, where free educational lessons can be organized, and take measures to increase the number of teachers African-Iraqis in educational institutions.
7. To organize awareness campaigns, through information and educational measures, with a view to restoring the dignity of people of African descent, and to consider providing support, directed at such activities, to NGOs, supporting educational and training initiatives for NGOs.

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
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